Liquidity Mergers by Heitor Almeida et al.











We thank Todd Gormley (AFA discussant), Charles Hadlock, Jerry Hoberg, Hernan Ortiz-Molina,
Gordon Phillips, Michael Schill (EFA discussant), Erik Theissen, and an anonymous referee for their
detailed comments and suggestions. Comments from audiences at the 2010 AFA Meetings, the 2010
EFA Meetings, ESMTBerlin, Michigan State University, MIT, Simon Fraser University, University
of British Columbia, University of Mannheim, University of Michigan, University of Utah, and Vienna
University are also appreciated. Lifeng Gu and Fabrício D’Almeida provided excellent research assistance.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Heitor Almeida, Murillo Campello, and Dirk Hackbarth. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Liquidity Mergers
Heitor Almeida, Murillo Campello, and Dirk Hackbarth




We study the interplay between corporate liquidity and asset reallocation opportunities. Our model
shows that financially distressed firms are acquired by liquid firms in their industries even when there
are no operational synergies associated with the merger. We call these transactions “liquidity mergers,”
since their main purpose is to reallocate liquidity to firms that might be otherwise inefficiently terminated.
We show that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur when industry-level asset specificity is high
(i.e., industry-specific rents are high) and firm-level asset specificity is low (industry counterparts
can efficiently operate distressed firms’ assets). We also provide a detailed analysis of firms’ liquidity
policies as a function of real asset reallocation, examining the trade-offs between cash and lines of
credit. The model makes a number of predictions that have not been examined in the literature. Using
a large sample of mergers, we verify the model’s prediction that liquidity-driven acquisitions are more
likely to occur in industries in which assets are industry-specific, but transferable across industry rival
firms. We also verify the prediction that firms are more likely to use credit lines (relative to cash) when
they operate in industries in which liquidity mergers are more frequent.
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Existing research argues investment funding is a key determinant of corporate liquidity policies (see,
e.g., Opler et al. (1999), Graham and Harvey (2001), Almeida et al. (2004), and Denis and Sibilikov
(2010)). Given that acquisitions are one of the most important forms of investment, one would expect
that the beneﬁts and costs of asset reallocation would be an important driver of liquidity. However,
this notion has been largely overlooked by the literature on corporate liquidity.
In this paper, we propose and develop a theoretical link between corporate liquidity policies and
asset reallocation opportunities. Our model explains why a distressed ﬁr mm i g h tb ea c q u i r e db ya
liquid ﬁrm in its industry even when there are no true operational synergies between the ﬁrms.1 We
call this type of acquisition a liquidity merger. The model adds to our understanding of liquidity man-
agement by showing how credit lines might dominate alternatives such as cash and ex-post ﬁnancing
in the funding of acquisitions. In particular, it shows that credit lines can be a particularly attractive
source of liquidity for high net worth, proﬁtable ﬁrms.
The model’s basic argument is as follows. Consider a ﬁrm that ﬁnds it diﬃcult to raise credit
because it cannot pledge its cash ﬂows to investors. Limited pledgeability can arise from many
sources, including moral hazard, asymmetric information, or private control beneﬁts. In the model,
ﬁrm insiders derive a non-pledgeable rent from their ability to manage assets that are industry-speciﬁc.
If the ﬁrm is hit by a liquidity shock that is larger than its pledgeable value, the ﬁrm might not be able
to raise the extra capital it needs even if continuation would be eﬃcient. One option is to liquidate
the distressed ﬁrm’s assets at the value that can be captured by industry outsiders (“sell for scrap”).
But if other industry players are able to operate the industry-speciﬁc assets (“putting those assets to
uses they were designed for”), an acquisition by a healthy industry rival may dominate liquidation.2
The problem with that alternative is that the acquirer itself may end up facing a similar pledgeability
problem. In particular, outside investors (including those of the acquirer) might be unwilling to ﬁnance
the merger since they can only capture the pledgeable portion of the gains associated with the deal.
How can the industry acquirer overcome this ﬁnancing problem? To do this, the acquirer needs
a source of funding that can be used at its discretion. The situation resembles the ex-ante liquidity
insurance problem of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). In the Holmstrom-Tirole framework, the
ﬁrm cannot wait to borrow after a large liquidity shock is realized because at that point external
1By “lack of true operational synergies” we mean that a merger between the ﬁrms would not increase their combined
value in the absence of ﬁnancial distress. We do not imply that mergers do not generate operational synergies, but
simply that they might occur even in the absence of such synergies. See Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) for evidence
on productivity gains arising from mergers.
2Consistent with this notion, Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2009) ﬁnd that inside liquidity (provided by buyers inside
the industry) reduces a ﬁrm’s cost of capital by more than outside liquidity (provided by ﬁrms outside the industry).
1investors would be unwilling to provide funds. Instead, the ﬁrm needs to contract its ﬁnancing ex-
ante. The optimal liquidity policy can be implemented either in terms of cash (the ﬁrm borrows
more than its ex-ante needs) or with an irrevocable line of credit. A similar logic follows through
in the ﬁnancing of a liquidity merger. The industry acquirer can overcome investors’ unwillingness
to ﬁnance the merger by accessing a discretionary form of ﬁnancing that does not require investors’
ex-post approval. Liquidity merge r st h u se m e r g ea sal i n kb e t w e e nﬁrm ﬁnancial policies and asset
reallocation opportunities in an industry.3
Putting our theory in perspective, we model the link between mergers and liquidity policy by em-
bedding the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998) liquidity demand model in an industry equilibrium
framework that draws on Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Previous research suggests that a practical
problem with lines of credit is that they may become unavailable precisely when the ﬁrm most needs
them. However, the industry acquirer is most likely to demand liquidity for an acquisition in states
in which it does not suﬀer a negative liquidity shock of its own. Hence covenants that link line of
credit availability to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow performance need not restrict the availability of ﬁnancing to
acquirers. We use this insight to show that lines of credit might dominate cash in ﬁnancing liquidity-
driven mergers, even when those credit facilities are revocable. In order to use cash to ﬁnance future
acquisitions, the acquirer would need to carry large balances from the current period to all future
states of the world. In the presence of a liquidity premium, this policy is costly. Given that cash
ﬂow-based covenants do not restrict the availability of merger ﬁnancing under the credit line, cash
becomes less desirable as the demand for merger ﬁnancing increases.4 The model analysis shows how
merger activity may inﬂuence whether ﬁrms use cash or credit lines in their liquidity management.
The analysis is novel, among other reasons, because it helps reconcile the observed positive correlation
between a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and its use of credit lines in lieu of cash for liquidity management (see
Suﬁ (2009) and Campello et al. (2010)).
Our model has several implications that have not yet been examined in the literature. First, it
predicts that liquidity mergers should be more frequent in industries with high asset speciﬁcity, but
among ﬁrms whose assets are not too ﬁrm-speciﬁc. We identify these industries empirically based on
two observations. First, we conjecture that industry-speciﬁcity is likely to be greater for assets such
as machinery and equipment than for land and buildings. Accordingly, we use the ratio of machinery
and equipment to total ﬁrm assets as a proxy for industry asset speciﬁcity (“machinery intensity”).
Second, we conjecture that ﬁrm-speciﬁcity should be inversely related to the degree of activity in
3Industry peers are unique liquidity providers in the Holmstrom-Tirole setup because unlike industry outsiders (e.g.,
buyout groups) their management can capture non-pledgeable income associated with the assets of distressed targets.
4As we discuss below, the credit line reduces liquidity premia since it does not require the ﬁrm (nor the lender) to
carry liquidity across time.
2asset resale market in a ﬁrm’s industry – the higher the use of second-hand capital amongst ﬁrms
in an industry, the less ﬁrm-speciﬁc the capital. To construct a measure of “capital salability” within
an industry, we hand collect data for used and new capital acquisitions from the Bureau of Census’
Economic Census. These data allow us to gauge asset salability through the ratio of used to total (i.e.,
used plus new) ﬁxed capital expenditures by ﬁrms in an industry (cf. Almeida and Campello (2007)).
Combining those two observations, we construct our desired measure as the product of “machinery
intensity” and “capital salability.” We call this composite proxy Transferable Assets.
We then investigate if the ratio of liquidity mergers to the total number of mergers in an industry
is related to asset speciﬁcity (Transferable Assets). Using a sample of 1,097 same-industry mergers
drawn from the SDC database between 1980 and 2006, we identify deals as potential liquidity mergers
as those in which the target is arguably close to ﬁnancial distress. Speciﬁcally, we attempt to isolate
targets that have lower interest coverage than the average target, but at the same time have high
proﬁtability (to alleviate concerns that the target ﬁrm may be economically distressed). Our tests
include cross-industry regressions that control for characteristics such as industry-wide measures of
ﬁnancial distress, concentration, and capacity utilization. Consistent with our theory, we ﬁnd evi-
dence that the likelihood of liquidity mergers is higher when assets are both highly industry-speciﬁc
and easily redeployable amongst industry rivals.5
In addition to our baseline test, we also examine the likelihood of same-industry acquisitions of
distressed targets in the aftermath of a liquidity shock. To do this, we examine the collapse of the junk
bond market in the late 1980s. A number of developments taking place in 1989 eﬀectively meant that
junk-bond issuers lost access to liquidity coming from the corporate bond market – they experienced
an exogenous shock to the supply of credit (see also Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). We study the
patterns of liquidity-driven acquisitions involving the ﬁr m st h a tw e r ea ﬀected by this pointed liquidity
shock. These additional tests conﬁrm our model’s prediction that, when faced with liquidity shocks,
ﬁrms may engage in merger deals in which their assets are transferred towards other ﬁrms in their
same industry depending on the level of asset speciﬁcity.
T h es e c o n dm o d e li m p l i c a t i o nt h a tw ee x a m i n ei st h a tﬁrms are more likely to use credit lines for
liquidity management if industry asset-speciﬁcity is high, but ﬁrm asset-speciﬁcity is low (i.e., when
Transferable Assets is high). We use two alternative data sources to test this implication. Our ﬁrst
sample consists of a large data set of loan initiations drawn from the LPC-DealScan over the 1987—2008
period. The LPC-DealScan data have two potential drawbacks, nonetheless. First, they are largely
based on syndicated loans, thus biased towards large deals (consequently large ﬁrms). Second, they do
5We also ﬁnd that the fraction of liquidity-driven deals in our sample of intra-industry m e r g e r si ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher
than the fraction of liquidity-driven deals in a sample of inter-industry mergers. This ﬁnding supports our contention
that industry ﬁrms are natural suppliers of liquidity for distressed rivals.
3not reveal the extent to which existing lines have been used (drawdowns). To overcome these issues,
we also use an alternative sample that contains detailed information on the credit lines initiated and
used by a random sample of 300 ﬁrms between 1996 and 2003. These data are drawn from Suﬁ (2009).
We measure the use of credit lines in corporate liquidity management by computing the ratio of
available credit lines to available credit lines plus cash holdings. Our panel regressions show that ﬁrms
are more likely to use credit lines in their liquidity management (relative to cash holdings) if they
operate in industries with speciﬁc but transferable assets. This result is statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. For example, when using Suﬁ’s (2009) sample we ﬁnd that a one-standard deviation in-
crease in Transferable Assets increases the ratio of credit lines to total liquidity by 0.10, approximately
20% of the mean value of this ratio. This result is consistent with the model’s implication that lines
of credit are an attractive way to ﬁnance growth opportunities such as liquidity-driven acquisitions.6
Existing survey evidence suggests that lines of credit are not only used for liquidity management,
but also to fund real operations (see Campello et al. (2010)). CFOs also indicate that credit lines are
used to ﬁnance growth opportunities (such as acquisitions), while cash is used to withstand negative
liquidity shocks (Lins et al. (2010)). To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that theoretically recon-
ciles real-world managers’ view that cash and lines of credit are used for diﬀerent purposes. A recent
paper by Gabudean (2007) analyzes the interplay among rivals’ cash policies in a Shleifer-Vishny
industry equilibrium, but it does not examine liquidity mergers nor the trade-oﬀ between cash and
credit lines. Asvanunt et al. (2007) show that cash holdings may be dominated by an adequately de-
signed line of credit policy. Our paper, however, is the ﬁr s tt om o d e lt h er o l eo fa l t e r n a t i v el i q u i d i t y
instruments in the ﬁnancing of acquisitions.7
Recent empirical papers examine the eﬀect of excess cash on acquisitions (e.g., Harford (1999),
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and Harford et al. (2008)). While their evidence also motivates
our analysis, we focus on the opposite direction of causality. Namely, we model how the anticipation
of acquisition opportunities aﬀects corporate liquidity policy. In this sense, our paper is closer to
Harford et al. (2009), who look at how deviations from target leverage aﬀect whether acquisitions are
ﬁnanced with debt or equity. The key diﬀerence is that we focus on liquidity policy variables rather
than leverage ratios. Our paper is also related to previous studies that analyze conglomerate mergers
as a way of dealing with the target’s inability to raise external funds (e.g., Hubbard and Palia (1999),
Fluck and Lynch (1999), Inderst and Mueller (2003)).8 One distinguishing feature of our merger
6We further discuss aggregate statistics and anecdotal evidence supporting our model’s intuition that lines of credit
are frequently used in the real-world to ﬁnance liquidity mergers.
7Maksimovic (1990) shows that credit lines can boost a ﬁrm’s competitive position in an imperfectly competitive
industry, but the author does not analyze the trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines.
8Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) consider an alternative neoclassical model of conglomerate mergers that rely on
productivity gains rather than ﬁnancing frictions.
4model is that it pertains to within-industry acquisitions, as opposed to diversifying mergers. On a
more theoretical level, we note that in prior models mergers help mitigate the friction that generates
the target’s ﬁnancial distress and increase the target’s external ﬁnancing capacity.9 However, it is not
the case that the acquirer directly supplies liquidity to the target as in our model, nor there is a clear
role for the acquirer’s liquidity policy.
The model we propose is novel in showing that acquirers from inside the industry are unique
in turning around distressed assets. In particular, managers of rival ﬁrms are special in that their
expertise allows them to extract asset-speciﬁcb e n e ﬁts from assets commonly used in their industry
(“transferable assets”). Those agents may both gainfully operate distressed assets in the industry and
bring to the table the funds needed to remedy liquidity shocks; funds that are made available immedi-
ately by virtue of pre-committed ﬁnancing arrangements. In this way, credit line-ﬁnanced rivals have
the necessary liquidity and ability to turn around distressed ﬁrms – they are unique in implementing
a liquidity merger. Our model and empirics contribute to the literature by characterizing a situation
in which liquidity constraints are resolved by a well-characterized combination of ﬁnancial contracting
and human capital expertise.
Finally, while the link between liquidity mergers and credit lines underlies our analysis, we stress
that a central contribution of our work is to demonstrate the more general idea that credit lines are
an eﬀective way to transfer liquidity across states. Our point about credit lines is that they are a
particularly eﬀective way to ﬁnance investment opportunities that arrive in good states of the world,
and for which the ﬁrm needs internal liquidity. While a “liquidity merger” strikes us as an interesting,
practical example of such investments, it is certainly not the only one. Notably, however, it would be
more diﬃcult to test the model’s predictions by looking at general investment items, such as capital
expenditures. This is so because it is diﬃcult to empirically isolate capital expenses that satisfy the
model’s conditions for a credit line to be an eﬀective liquidity management tool (e.g., they need to
arrive in good states of the world and strictly require internal liquidity). Similarly, the key economic
insight behind the liquidity merger story is the advantage that the industry acquirer has in liquidity
provision to distressed rivals. Whether the acquirer can supply liquidity to distressed ﬁrms depends
on whether the acquirer has enough committed liquidity to draw on, and not on whether the liquidity
comes strictly from credit lines.
In the next section we develop the benchmark model of liquidity demand and liquidity mergers.
We do so under a security-design framework in which ﬁrms choose their optimal liquidity demand (at
ﬁrst) without any implementation constraints. The implementation of optimal liquidity using cash
and credit lines is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 introduces a number of extensions to the basic
9Stein (2003) calls this argument the “more money eﬀect.”
5model. Section 5 discusses the model’s main empirical implications. The model’s predictions are
tested in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are placed in the Appendix.
2. A model of liquidity mergers and liquidity demand
We start from Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997, 1998) model of corporate liquidity demand, and embed
the ﬁrm’s liquidity optimization problem in an industry equilibrium that follows Shleifer and Vishny
(1992). While these two theoretical pieces are well known, their insights have not been brought up
together as a way to rationalize ﬁrm liquidity policy as a function of merger activity.
2.1. Basic framework
Consider an industry with two ﬁrms, which we call H and L.10 There are three dates, and no discount-
ing. Both ﬁrms have an investment opportunity of ﬁxed size I at date 0. The ﬁrms diﬀer according to
their date-0 wealth, A.F i r mH is a high wealth ﬁrm, so that AH >A L. The investment opportunity
also requires an additional investment at date 1, of uncertain size. This additional investment repre-
sents the ﬁr m s ’l i q u i d i t yn e e da td a t e1 .W ea s s u m et h a tt h ed a t e1i n v e s t m e n tc a nb ee i t h e re q u a lt o
ρ, with probability λ,o r0, with probability (1−λ). For now, we take that the investment need is i.i.d.
across ﬁrms, that is, the probability that ﬁrm H draws ρ is independent of whether ﬁrm L draws ρ or
0. We refer to states using probabilities. So, for example, state λ2 is the state in which both ﬁrms have
date 1 investment needs. For convention, we let λ(1−λ) be the state in which only ﬁrm H has a liq-
uidity need for investment, and (1−λ)λ be the state in which only ﬁrm L has a date 1 liquidity need.11
A ﬁrm will only continue its date 0 investment until date 2 if it can meet the date 1 liquidity need.
If the ﬁrm continues, the investment produces a date-2 cash ﬂow R which obtains with probability
p. With probability 1 − p the investment produces nothing. The probability of success depends on
the input of speciﬁc human capital by the ﬁrms’ managers. If the managers exert high eﬀort, the
probability of success is equal to pG.I fe ﬀort is low, the probability of success is lower, equal to pB;
however, managers consume a private beneﬁte q u a lt oB. Because of the private beneﬁt, managers
must keep a high enough stake in the project to induce eﬀort. We assume that the investment is
negative NPV if the managers do not exert eﬀort, implying the following incentive constraint:





10In Section 4 we consider an extension in which there are many ﬁrms of each type.
11In Section 4 we consider, among other extensions, positively correlated investment needs and continuously
distributed liquidity shocks.
6where RM is the managers’ compensation and ∆p = pG−pB. This moral hazard problem implies that
the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows cannot be pledged in their entirety to outside investors. Following Holmstrom
and Tirole, we deﬁne:
ρ0 ≡ pG(R −
B
∆p
) <ρ 1 ≡ pGR.( 2 )
The parameter ρ0 represents the investment’s pledgeable income, and ρ1 its total expected payoﬀ.
Using moral hazard to generate limited pledgeability greatly improves the model’s tractability. How-
ever, we stress that this interpretation does not need to be taken literally. For example, our model’s
central results would carry through if limited pledgeability was generated by information frictions
between ﬁrm insiders and outside investors.
If the ﬁrm cannot meet the liquidity need, it is liquidated generating an exogenous payoﬀ that
does not rely on industry-speciﬁc managerial human capital (and thus is fully pledgeable to outside
investors). We let this liquidation value be equal to τ<I . In the current model, liquidation should be
interpreted as the value of the ﬁrm’s assets to an “outsider,” that is, an investor who does not possess
industry-speciﬁc human capital. The higher the τ, the lower is the industry-speciﬁcity of the ﬁrm’s
assets. We assume that the project is positive NPV, even if it needs to be liquidated in state (1−λ):
U =( 1− λ)ρ1 + λτ − I>0.( 3 )
In lieu of liquidation, a ﬁrm that cannot meet its liquidity need can try to sell its assets to another
ﬁrm in the industry. Since managers of other industry ﬁrms have industry-speciﬁc human capital,
they may be able to generate higher value from the assets. However, because human capital may have
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component, industry managers are not perfect substitutes for each other. We assume
that an industry manager can produce a cash ﬂow R− δ
pG by operating the assets of another industry
ﬁrm.12 The parameter δ captures the extent to which industry assets are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. For simplicity,
we assume that the buyer of the assets always makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the distressed seller,
meaning that the transaction price is always equal to the seller’s outside option (τ).13
Figure 1 About Here
Figure 1 shows the model’s time line and summarizes the sequence of actions from the perspective
of ﬁrm H.T h eﬁgure also includes the realizations of liquidity shocks aﬀecting ﬁrm L to show how
the actions of ﬁrm H depend on whether ﬁrm L is in distress. To simplify the tree, we assume that
ﬁrm H will only bid for ﬁrm L in the state in which ﬁrm H does not have to ﬁnance its own liquidity
shock (i.e., state (1−λ)). As we show below, this is a natural outcome of the model. In addition, the
12The probability of success and the private beneﬁt are assumed to be the same as in the original ﬁrm. Thus, the
asset generates date-1 pledgeable income equal to ρ0 − δ if it is reallocated across ﬁrms.
13In Section 4 we discuss the more general case in which the seller also has some bargaining power.
7tree incorporates the fact that managers must exert high eﬀort on the equilibrium path and hence
the probability of success at date 2 is always equal to pG.
2.1.1. Assumptions about pledgeability and net worth
We make the following assumptions about the model parameters:
ρ0 <ρ<ρ 1 − τ.( 4 )
Given that a liquidity shock occurs, the net beneﬁt of continuation is ρ1 −τ. This assumption means
that it is optimal for the ﬁrms to withstand the liquidity shock, but that date-1 pledgeable income
is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the shock. The model becomes trivial if this assumption does not hold, in
that ﬁrms will generally not need liquidity insurance (if ρ0 ≥ ρ), or that it will never be optimal to
survive a liquidity shock or to bid for the other industry ﬁrm (if ρ ≥ ρ1 − τ).
We make the following assumption about AL:
ρ0 − λρ < I − AL ≤ (1 − λ)ρ0 + λτ.( 5 )
This implies that ﬁrm L does not have enough pledgeable income to be able to meet the liquidity need
ρ in state λ.H o w e v e r ,i fﬁrm L is liquidated in state λ, it generates total expected date 0 pledgeable
income of (1−λ)ρ0+λτ, which by (5) is larger than I−AL. This assumption allows us to focus on the
most interesting case in which ﬁrm L invests at date 0 and may become a target for ﬁrm H at date 1.
In this three-period model, the ﬁrm’s “wealth level” A is a quantity that summarizes the ﬁrm’s re-
cent history, in particular the cumulative eﬀects of past cash ﬂow innovations. Assumption 5 captures
the possibility that some industry ﬁrms may have, at some point in time, low enough accumulated
wealth that they cannot fund future liquidity shocks on their own. Despite having low liquidity,
ﬁrms of type L retain proﬁtable investment opportunities. Speciﬁcally, condition 4 says that ﬁrm L’s
assets produce greater value under continuation (ρ1 −ρ) than liquidation (τ). Thus, ﬁrm L faces the
potential of ﬁnancial distress if a liquidity shock hits at date 1.
We make the following assumption about AH:
ρ0 − 2λρ − λ[τ − (ρ0 − δ)] <I− AH ≤ ρ0 − λρ − (1 − λ)λ[ρ + τ − (ρ0 − δ)].( 6 )
This assumption ensures that ﬁrm H has enough pledgeable income to withstand the liquidity shock
and also bid for ﬁrm L in the case ﬁrm L is in distress. However, pledgeable income is enough to
ﬁnance H’s bid only in the event that H itself does not have a liquidity need in date 1. The role of
this assumption will become clearer below. It captures the idea that ﬁrm H will be most likely to bid
for L if its internal liquidity is high, which will happen in the case that H does not suﬀer a liquidity
shock. Clearly, if ﬁrm H never has enough pledgeable income to to bid for ﬁrm L there will be no
interactions among ﬁrms in the model.
82.1.2. External ﬁnancing and liquidity insurance
Firms raise funds from external investors to ﬁnance the date-0 investment I, the date-1 investment
ρ (when it is required), and also the bid for other industry ﬁrms that might become distressed.
Throughout, we make the usual assumption that contracts are structured such that investors break
even from the perspective of date 0.
In order to characterize the best possible ﬁnancial contract that ﬁrms can get, we ﬁrst take a
security-design approach. Speciﬁcally, we assume that ﬁrms can write state-contingent contracts with
e x t e r n a li n v e s t o r st h a ts p e c i f yt h ea m o u n to fp a y m e n t st h a ta r em a d ei ne a c hs t a t eo ft h ew o r l da t
date 1 and date 2. In Section 3, we will implement this optimal contract using real-world securities
(such as cash and credit lines). This solution method helps highlight the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e nc a s ha n d
credit lines by comparing them against a benchmark of perfect state-contingent contracts.
In addition to date-1 payments, the optimal date-0 contract speciﬁes the amount of external ﬁ-
nance that ﬁrms raise at date 0, and the promised payment in case of success at date 2 (which happens
with probability pG). We denote the contractual amounts by (K0,K 1,s,K 2,s),w h e r es denotes the
state of nature that realizes at date 1 (for example, λ(1 − λ)).14
These contractual amounts must satisfy feasibility and pledgeability constraints. For each ﬁrm
j we must have that K0 ≥ I − Aj,s ot h a tﬁrms have enough funds to start their projects. The
constraints that K1,s must meet depend on the investment strategy that ﬁrms wish to implement at
date 1. For example, in order for ﬁrms to withstand the liquidity shock in state λ it must be the
case that K1,λ ≥ ρ.F o raﬁrm to be able to bid for the other ﬁrm in state (1 − λ)λ,w em u s th a v e
K1,(1−λ)λ ≥ ρ + τ, so that the acquirer can cover the target’s liquidity shock and liquidation option.
The date-2 promised payments must obey the pledgeability constraints. In states in which a ﬁrm
continues but does not acquire other assets, we must have −K2,s ≤ R − B
∆p (or −pGK2,s ≤ ρ0). If
a ﬁrm acquires the other one in state (1 − λ)λ,w em u s th a v e−pGK2,(1−λ)λ ≤ 2ρ0 − δ. Finally, the
payments (K0,K 1,s,K 2,s) must be set such that investors break even from the perspective of date 0.
2.2. Equilibria
In equilibrium, ﬁrms choose their optimal investment and ﬁn a n c i n gp o l i c i e st a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h e
optimal actions of the other ﬁrm. The model generates two diﬀerent equilibria, depending on whether
a liquidity merger is proﬁtable or not. The liquidity merger is not proﬁtable if:
ρ1 − δ<ρ+ τ.( 7 )
14Since ﬁrms produce zero cash ﬂows in case of failure at date 2, the realization of uncertainty at date 2 is irrelevant.
Firms promise payments out of date-2 cash ﬂows, which are made only in the case of success.
9Firm H can generate a date-1 expected payoﬀ of ρ1 − δ by operating the assets of ﬁrm L.H o w e v e r ,
the merger requires ﬁrm H to cover L’s liquidity shock and compensate L’s investors, which involves
an investment of ρ + τ. By the same logic, the liquidity merger is proﬁtable if:15
ρ1 − δ ≥ ρ + τ.( 8 )
We prove the following proposition in Appendix A:
Proposition 1 Under state-contingent contracting, the model generates the following equilibria:
• If condition 7 holds, then the model’s unique equilibrium is one in which ﬁrm L is liquidated in
state λ, and continues its project otherwise. Firm H always continues, and there is no liquidity
merger. These equilibrium strategies can be supported by the following state-contingent ﬁnancial
policies. For ﬁrm L, KL
0 = I − AL, −KL
1,λ = τ, KL
1,(1−λ) =0 ,a n d−KL
2,(1−λ) ≤
ρ0
pG,s u c h
that investors break even at date 0.F o rﬁrm H, KH
0 = I − AH, KH
1,λ = ρ, KH
1,(1−λ) =0 ,a n d
−K2 ≤
ρ0
pG, such that investors break even at date 0.
• If condition 8 holds, the model’s unique equilibrium involves a liquidity merger in state (1−λ)λ,
in which ﬁrm H acquires ﬁrm L. Firm L is liquidated in state λ2,i sa c q u i r e db yﬁrm H in state
(1 − λ)λ, and continues its project otherwise. Firm H always continues its project. Firm L’s
policy is identical to the one above. Firm H’s policy is KH
0 = I−AH, KH











pG, such that investors
break even at date 0.
It is interesting to discuss this result focusing on ﬁrm L ﬁrst. By condition 5, ﬁrm L does not
have enough pledgeable income to withstand the liquidity shock when it occurs at date 1. In addition,
the assumption that ﬁrm H (the potential acquirer) has all the bargaining power in the event of a
merger ensures that ﬁrm L’s payoﬀ is independent of ﬁrm H’s policies (ﬁrm L’s payoﬀ is always equal
to τ in state λ). Thus, ﬁrm L’s policy is unchanged across the diﬀerent equilibria. It simply entails
borrowing enough funds to start the project, and then using pledgeable future cash ﬂows to repay
external investors.
Firm H’s optimal policies, in turn, will depend on the level of industry- and ﬁrm-speciﬁcity. The
equilibrium with no liquidity merger is more likely to hold when industry speciﬁcity is low (τ is high),
or ﬁrm speciﬁcity is high (δ is low). In this equilibrium, ﬁrm H’s optimal investment policy is to
15Under this condition, ﬁrm L’s fundamental value (conditional on the liquidity shock) is ρ1 −δ −ρ. The assumption
that ﬁrm H can make a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer to ﬁrm L ensures that H can purchase ﬁrm L at a price (τ)t h a ti s
lower than the fundamental value. As we discuss later (see Section 4.5), the key assumption for the model’s logic to
go through is that ﬁrm L’s price is lower than the fundamental value, though ﬁrm L can also capture part of the gains
from the liquidity merger.
10start its own project at date 0 and reinvest ρ in state λ at date 1 (so that it continues until the ﬁnal
date). In order to support this policy, ﬁrm H borrows suﬃcient funds to start the project at date 0
(KH
0 = I−AH) and receives an additional payment of ρ from external investors in state λ (KH
1,λ = ρ).
It promises a date-2 payment K2 (in both states), so that investors break even.
If condition 8 holds, it becomes optimal for ﬁrm H to bid for ﬁrm L in state (1−λ)λ, provided that
it has enough liquidity in that state. In addition, ﬁrm H must have enough liquidity to withstand its
o w nl i q u i d i t ys h o c ki ns t a t eλ. This equilibrium requires that KH
1,λ = ρ and KH
1,(1−λ)λ = ρ+τ.N o t i c e
also that since H is acquiring L,a sl o n ga sρ0 − δ>0 its pledgeable income will increase in state
(1−λ)λ. Thus, it can repay up to 2ρ0−δ in that state. The assumption in equation 6 guarantees that H
can ﬁnance both its own liquidity shock and the liquidity merger. Finally, equation 6 also implies that
H cannot ﬁnance the liquidity merger in state λ2 (when it needs to ﬁnance its own liquidity shock).
For future reference, the date-0 expected payoﬀs in the equilibrium with no liquidity merger are:
UN
H =( 1 − λ)ρ1 + λ(ρ1 − ρ) − I (9)
UL =( 1 − λ)ρ1 + λτ − I.
By conditions 3 and 4 both UN
H and UL are positive, so both ﬁrms invest at date 0.
The date-0 expected payoﬀs in the liquidity merger equilibrium are:
UM
H =( 1 − λ)2ρ1 +( 1− λ)λ(2ρ1 − ρ − δ − τ)+λ(ρ1 − ρ) − I (10)
UL =( 1 − λ)ρ1 + λτ − I.
Firm H’s expected payoﬀ is higher in equation 10 than in equation 9. This happens because H
captures the gains from the merger. At the same time, L’s expected payoﬀ does not change.
It is important to stress that our model implies that industry counterparts are in a unique position
to acquire and operate distressed assets because they can capture non-pledgeable income associated
with those assets (non-pledgeable income is represented by ρ1 − δ − ρ0 in the model above). Other
pure-liquidity providers would not be able to extract the same private gains from the assets. Having a
buyout group acquiring the ﬁrm and re-hiring the manager would change the players, but not solve the
problem since the maximum payoﬀ of the acquisition for the buyout group in that case would be equal
to ρ0 (the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income under the incumbent management, which is lower than the required
investment ρ+τ). A buyout group is similar to other liquidity providers in that they, too, would need
to give the incumbent manager of the distressed ﬁrm a share of the surplus that pays for his private
beneﬁts (to keep incentives in line). Those beneﬁts are associated with unpledgeable expertise. The
only providers of liquidity that can take over distressed assets and extract asset-speciﬁcb e n e ﬁts are
the managers of other similar ﬁrms. Our model is unique in characterizing this motivation for mergers.
11Naturally, in order for a liquidity merger to be feasible, the acquirer (ﬁrm H)m u s tb ea b l et o
implement the state-contingent ﬁnancial policy that is suggested by Proposition 1. We examine this
issue in turn.
2.3. Main features of the optimal ﬁnancial policy
Before implementing the ﬁnancial policies that support each of the above equilibria, it is worth dis-
cussing their main features. In particular, while ﬁrm L’s ﬁnancial policy is simple (it involves only
raising funds to ﬁnance the initial investment), ﬁrm H’s ﬁnancial policy involves state-contingent
transfers from external investors to fund the liquidity shock and the bid for ﬁrm L.
T h ek e ye c o n o m i cf e a t u r eo ft h e s et r a n s f e r si st h a tt h e ym u s ti n v o l v es o m ed e g r e eo fpre-commitment
from external investors. Investors will generally not ﬁnd it optimal to provide suﬃcient date-1 ﬁnanc-
ing for the ﬁrm after the liquidity need is realized. In order to insure it has enough liquidity, ﬁrm H
must gain access to a source of funds that does not require ex-post approval from external investors
in good states of the world.
To see this, consider ﬁrst the equilibrium with no liquidity mergers. The optimal policy in Propo-
sition 1 involves a liquidity infusion in state λ equal to KH
1,λ = ρ. Notice that this infusion of cash
is greater than the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income in state λ, which is equal to ρ0 (by condition 4). Thus,
the ﬁrm will only be able to withstand the liquidity shock if it can access a pre-contracted amount
of ﬁnancing greater than or equal to ρ.T h i s ﬁnancing can come, for example, from cash holdings
(which the ﬁrm puts aside in date 0 and retains until date 1). Or it can come from a credit line. In
either case, this liquidity injection generates a loss of ρ − ρ0 for external investors. To compensate
external investors for this loss, the optimal contract includes a net positive payment from the ﬁrm
to investors in state (1 − λ), i.e., the state with no liquidity shock. If that state obtains, the ﬁrm
receives zero transfers at date 1, KH
1,(1−λ) =0 , but repays a positive amount to investors in date 2,
KH
2,(1−λ) = K2. In other words, the optimal contract speciﬁes a transfer of ﬁnancing capacity from
state (1 − λ), where it is not needed, to state λ, where it is crucial.
A similar intuition holds for the liquidity merger equilibrium. The optimal policy involves liquid-
ity transfers equal to KH
1,λ = ρ and KH
1,(1−λ)λ = ρ + τ. As in the other equilibrium, the ﬁrm needs
pre-committed ﬁnancing in state λ to ﬁnance its own liquidity shock, since ρ>ρ 0. In state (1−λ)λ,
the pledgeable income generated by the acquisition of ﬁrm L is equal to ρ0 − δ.C l e a r l y ,t h i si sl o w e r
than the investment that ﬁrm H needs to make in that state, which is equal to ρ+τ. However, notice
that ﬁrm H also has pledgeable income equal to ρ0 in state (1 − λ)λ, which it can use to fund the
acquisition of ﬁrm L as well. This means that H needs pre-committed ﬁnancing to acquire L when:
2ρ0 − δ<ρ+ τ.( 1 1 )
12This is a suﬃcient condition for ﬁrm H to need pre-committed ﬁnancing.16 If this inequality holds,
the ﬁrm will need to transfer ﬁnancing capacity into state (1 − λ)λ. As in the analysis above, ﬁrm
H compensates external investors for the provision of pre-committed ﬁnancing by making payments
in states in which such ﬁnancing is not needed. In particular, in the liquidity merger equilibrium the
ﬁrm can pledge the cash ﬂows that are produced in state (1 − λ)2,i nw h i c hﬁrm H never needs any





Finally, notice that a ﬁnancial contract that provides pre-committed ﬁnancing is a liquidity in-
surance mechanism for the ﬁrm. Essentially, the ﬁrm buys liquidity insurance (infusions of liquidity
that generate ex-post losses for external investors), by paying an “insurance premium” in the states
of the world in which liquidity infusions are not needed. This liquidity insurance intuition will also
be useful to understand some of the features of the implementation that we discuss below.
3. Implementation of the optimal ﬁnancing policy
In Section 2 we assumed that the ﬁrms can perfectly contract on state-contingent ﬁnancing, subject
only to investor break-even and pledgeability constraints. In this section, we study the implementation
of the equilibrium policies described above with real-world ﬁnancial instruments.
As the discussion in Section 2.3 indicates, the optimal ﬁnancing policy must involve some form
of pre-committed ﬁnancing, or liquidity insurance. In the real world, there are two main instruments
that ﬁrms use to insure their liquidity, namely, cash holdings and bank credit lines. Provided that
cash holdings are under the control of the ﬁrm, cash is the simplest form of pre-committed ﬁnancing.
Credit lines can also play the role of pre-committed ﬁnancing, provided that they can be made irrev-
ocable (that is, the ﬁrm can draw on the credit line even when the bank is not properly compensated
for the risk of the loan).
Other ﬁnancing mechanisms, while important for the ﬁrm, may not satisfy this pre-committed
feature of the optimal contract. For example, a “debt capacity” strategy of carrying low debt into
the future in the expectation that additional debt can be issued in the event of a liquidity shock may
fail, because debt capacity will dry up precisely in times when the liquidity shock hits. For similar
reasons, post-liquidity-shock equity issuance may fail to provide enough liquidity for the ﬁrm.
16As we show in more detail below, whether this condition is also necessary depends on the details of the ﬁnancial
policy that implements the optimal contract characterized in this section. In particular, condition 11 is necessary only
in the (extreme) case in which ﬁrm H is allowed to fully dilute the claims by date-0 external investors. For example,
if ﬁrm H enters date 1 with some debt in its capital structure (issued at date 0), then condition 11 presumes that the
ﬁrm can issue date-1 debt that is senior to the date-0 debt. Since this is unlikely to be true in reality, ﬁrm H is likely
to require pre-committed ﬁnancing even when 2ρ0 − δ>ρ+ τ.
133.1. Buying liquidity insurance: Cash and credit lines
Our main goal is to propose a trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines and to show how this trade-oﬀ
depends on the particular industry equilibrium predicted by the model. Before we do so, it is useful
to understand intuitively how the ﬁrm can use cash and credit lines to replicate the ﬁnancial policies
speciﬁed in Proposition 1. Full implementation details will be provided in Section 3.2.
Besides cash and credit lines, to implement the optimal policy the ﬁrm will need to issue standard
securities such as debt and equity. For concreteness, we will assume that the ﬁrm issues debt, even
though the results are unchanged if we allow the ﬁrm to issue equity as well. In addition, we assume
that if the ﬁrm issues debt at date 0, this debt is senior to any additional debt that the ﬁrm issues at
date 1. While this is a realistic assumption, we also note that the results do not change if we allow
the ﬁrm to violate priority at date 1.
We let D0 represent the face value of the debt that ﬁrm H issues at date 0, and D1,s represent
the face value of debt that ﬁrm H issues in state s at date 1. In case of success, the ﬁrm repays debt
in date 2. For future reference, let D∗
0 represent the amount of date 0 debt that ﬁrm H needs to issue
to be able to start its own project at date 0:
pGD∗
0 = I − AH. (12)
To implement the optimal policy using cash, the ﬁrm borrows more than D∗
0 (call this amount of
debt DC
0 ) and retains the extra funds in the balance sheet. The ﬁr mc a nt h e nu s ec a s ht oﬁnance the
date 1 liquidity shock and the bid for the other industry ﬁrm. Recall that external investors may be
unwilling to contribute cash at date 1 due to limited pledgeability. Thus, the ﬁrm must be given the
right to use cash balances at date 1, without requiring investor approval. Finally, the ﬁrm uses its
excess liquidity (in states in which cash balances are not required at date 1) to ensure that external
investors break even from the point of view of date 0.
To implement the optimal policy using a credit line, the ﬁrm does not need to borrow more than
D∗
0 at the initial date. Instead, it enters a contract with date-0 investors of the following form. It
commits to make a payment equal to x at date 1 in exchange for the right to borrow an amount w
that is lower than a pre-speciﬁed amount equal to wmax, in case additional liquidity is needed at date
1. Provided that the date-0 investor cannot revoke the contract at date 1, this contract may allow the
ﬁr mt ob o r r o wm o r et h a ni t sp l e d g e a b l ei n c o m ea td a t e1 .T h eﬁrm compensates the date-0 investor
for this right, by paying the “commitment fee” x in the states in which it does not need additional
liquidity. Such a contract closely resembles a bank-provided credit line, which typically requires the
ﬁrm to pay a fee to keep the line open in exchange for the right to borrow up to a pre-speciﬁed amount
(the size of the credit facility).
143.2. The trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines
To clarify the trade-oﬀ between cash and credit lines, we start by assuming that the ﬁrm can only
use one of the instruments in isolation. In Section 4.1 we allow the ﬁrm to use both instruments and
show when the ﬁrm can beneﬁt from using cash and lines of credit simultaneously.
3.2.1. Cash policy
As the discussion in Section 3.1 suggests, cash implementation requires the ﬁrm to carry cash balances
across time. Existing evidence suggests that carrying cash is costly for the ﬁrm, for example because
of the existence of a liquidity premium. Consistent with this argument, most theoretical papers on
cash policy assume a (deadweight) cost of carrying cash across time (see, e.g., Kim et al. (1998) and
Almeida et al. (2009)). In our model, we capture the cost of carrying cash by assuming that the ﬁrm
loses a fraction ξ of every dollar of cash that is carried across dates. For example, if the ﬁrm saves C
dollars at date 0, then only (1 − ξ)C is available to ﬁnance investments at date 1.
To see how the cash implementation works, consider ﬁrst the equilibrium without the liquidity
merger. That is, assume that condition 7 holds. In this case, the optimal ﬁnancial policy in state λ
involves a transfer from investors of KH
1,λ = ρ,w h i c ha l l o w sﬁrm H to ﬁnance the liquidity shock. To
implement this policy using cash, notice that for a given amount of debt DC
0 issued at date 0, and
given the seniority assumption, the ﬁrm has additional debt capacity equal to ρ0 − pGDc
0 at date 1.
To survive the liquidity shock in state λ,t h eﬁrm must thus save the following amount of cash:
(1 − ξ)C + ρ0 − pGDC
0 = ρ.( 1 3 )
The ﬁrm raises the cash at date 0 by borrowing I −AH +C, and returns cash to investors at date
1 in state (1−λ). Because of the cost of carrying cash, the ﬁrm can only return (1−ξ)C to investors
in that state. Finally, the ﬁrm repays DC
0 in case of success at date 2. The date-0 investor break-even
constraint becomes:
pGDC
0 +( 1− λ)(1 − ξ)C = I − AH + C.( 1 4 )
Finally, the pledgeability constraint requires that pGDC
0 ≤ ρ0.
As we show in Appendix B, if ξ =0we obtain the same solution as in Proposition 1. As ξ
increases, cash implementation may no longer be feasible.17 Even if cash implementation is feasible,
the cost of carrying cash implies a reduction in the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ. In the appendix, we derive an exact
solution for the optimal amount of cash C that the ﬁr mn e e d st oh o l di fi td o e sn o tn e e dt oﬁnance
the merger and the condition under which holding this cash level is feasible.
17That is, we may not ﬁnd a value D
C
0 that satisﬁes both equation 14 and the condition that pGD
C
0 ≤ ρ0.
15Let us consider now the liquidity merger equilibrium. The crucial change in the optimal ﬁnancial
policy of Proposition 1 is that ﬁrm H must also ﬁnance the bid for ﬁrm L in state (1 − λ)λ,t h a ti s ,
KH
1,(1−λ)λ = ρ+τ.I fw el e tCM denote the amount of cash that ﬁrm must hold in the liquidity merger
equilibrium and DM
0 the associated date-0 debt issuance, ﬁnancing the liquidity merger equilibrium
with cash requires ﬁrm H to ﬁnance both its own liquidity shock and also the bid for ﬁrm L.
In the appendix, we show that as long as the ﬁrm requires some amount of pre-committed ﬁnancing
to fund the liquidity merger, it must save more cash in the liquidity merger equilibrium (CM >C ). As
discussed above (equation 11), ﬁrm H may not need pre-committed ﬁnancing to ﬁnance the acquisition
of ﬁrm L since it can use both its pledgeable income and the pledgeable income from the acquisition
to ﬁnance the bid (a total of 2ρ0 − δ). In addition to the bid, the ﬁrm needs to repay date-0 debt.
Therefore it will need pre-committed ﬁnancing as long as:
2ρ0 − δ − pGDC
0 <ρ+ τ,( 1 5 )
where DC
0 i st h ea m o u n to fd e b tt h a ta l l o w st h eﬁrm to carry cash balances equal to C (the minimum
amount required to fund the liquidity shock). If condition 15 holds, the ﬁrm will need to use cash
holdings to ﬁnance the liquidity merger and will return less cash to investors in state (1−λ). Investors
will then require additional compensation to ﬁnance the ﬁrm at date 0 (that is, DM
0 >D C
0 ). Accord-
ingly, the ﬁrm must save additional cash to survive the liquidity shock in state λ. In equilibrium, we
must then have CM >Cas well.
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition (see proof in Appendix B):
Proposition 2 Let C represent the optimal cash balance in the case in which condition 7 holds, such
that the liquidity merger is not proﬁtable, and CM represent the optimal cash balance when 8 holds,
such that the liquidity merger is proﬁtable. It follows that CM ≥ C, with strict inequality if condition
15 holds. In addition, let ξmax
NM be the maximum cost of cash such that C is feasible, and ξmax
M the
maximum cost that allows CM to be feasible. It follows that ξmax
NM ≥ ξmax
M , with strict inequality if
condition 15 holds. Finally, ﬁrm H’s payoﬀ is:
UNC
H = UN
H − ξC, (16)
in the equilibrium with no liquidity mergers if ξ ≤ ξmax
NM,a n dUNC
H =0if ξ>ξ max
NM. In the equilibrium
with liquidity mergers, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is:
UMC
H = UM
H − ξCM (17)
if ξ ≤ ξmax
M ,a n dUMC
H =0if ξ>ξ max
M . UN
H and UM
H are given, respectively, by equations 9 and 10.
163.2.2. Lines of credit
T h ea d v a n t a g eo fac r e d i tl i n er e l a t i v et oc a s hi st h a ti td o e sn o tr e q u i r et h eﬁrm to hoard internal
liquidity. Under credit line implementation, the ﬁrm raises pre-committed ﬁnancing only in the states
in which such ﬁnancing is needed, conditional on the realization of the liquidity need. Thus, the credit
line economizes on the liquidity cost ξ.F o rt h eﬁrm, the cost of opening the credit line is that the ﬁrm
m u s tc o m p e n s a t et h eb a n kb ym a k i n gp a y m e n t si ns t a t e so ft h ew o r l di nw h i c ht h ec r e d i tl i n ei sn o t
used. As shown by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006), the credit line can be structured
as an “actuarially fair” contract, such that the expected payments from the ﬁrm to the bank are equal
to zero. The main reason for this result is that credit line contracts allow the bank to operate as a “liq-
uidity pool” that uses the payments coming from liquid ﬁrms to fund credit line drawdowns from ﬁrms
that need additional liquidity.18 In particular, since the bank can fund credit line drawdowns using
payments from liquid ﬁrms, the bank does not need to carry liquid funds in its balance sheet over time.
In the appendix, we show that under the assumptions of our model, a ﬁnancial intermediary such as a
bank can indeed pool liquidity in an eﬃcient way, and provide credit lines at an actuarially fair cost.19
The line of credit implementation relies on a commitment by the external investor (e.g., the bank)
who provides the line to the ﬁrm. Existing empirical evidence, however, suggests that credit lines
are not perfectly irrevocable. Suﬁ (2009) ﬁnds that if ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows deteriorate, the ﬁrm’s access
to credit lines is restricted through loan covenants. This result suggests that the ﬁrm might not be
able to rely on credit lines to provide liquidity insurance in bad states of the world. In terms of our
model, line of credit implementation is most likely to create problems in state λ,i nw h i c hﬁrm H is
ﬁnancially distressed. We capture this feature of credit lines by assuming that the outside investor
denies ﬁnancing in state λ with a probability equal to q ≤ 1.
W h i l ew et a k et h ep r o b a b i l i t yq to be exogenous in the solution below, in the appendix we show
that q can be endogenized in a framework in which the probability of the date 1’s liquidity shock is
aﬀected by managerial eﬀort (see Appendix D). In this framework, line of credit revocability gives
incentives for the manager to try to avoid the occurrence of the liquidity shock.
To illustrate the credit line implementation, we proceed as above by analyzing the case of no
liquidity mergers. Under credit line implementation, the ﬁrm does not need to borrow more than
the minimum required to start the project at date 0 (call this debt level DLC
0 ). If the credit line is
18Acharya et al. (2010) show that exposure to aggregate liquidity risk places a limit on this pooling of liquidity
needs, and increases the cost of credit lines for ﬁrms with high aggregate risk exposure. They show that aggregate risk
may be an additional reason why ﬁrms use cash instead of credit lines to manage liquidity.
19In order to show this point (which is predicated on the existence of many ﬁrms that pool liquidity through the
bank), we use an extension in which there are many ﬁrms of both types H and L. We note that the result is independent
of the speciﬁcf r a c t i o no fﬁr m st h a ti so fe a c ht y p e .
17revoked in state λ the ﬁrm is liquidated, and thus the date-0 investor break-even constraint gives:
(1 − λq)pGDLC
0 + λqτ = I − AH.( 1 8 )
We denote the maximum size of the line in this equilibrium by wmax, and the commitment fee
that the ﬁrm pays to the external investor by x.F o rt h eﬁrm to survive the liquidity shock in state
λ, the credit line must obey:
wmax + ρ0 − pGDLC
0 ≥ ρ.( 1 9 )
This equation incorporates the ﬁrm’s ability to issue new debt at date 1 up to the ﬁrm’s date-1
pledgeable income (ρ0 − pGDLC
0 ). In state (1 −λ),t h eﬁrm does not use the credit line and pays the
commitment fee x. The commitment fee is set such that the investor breaks even, given the amount
by which the credit line is expected to be used (wmax):20
λ(1 − q)wmax =( 1− λ)x.( 2 0 )
T h ec r e d i tl i n ei sf e a s i b l ea sl o n ga st h eﬁrm has enough pledgeable income to pay the commitment
fee (x ≤ ρ0 − pGDLC
0 ), which gives:
I − AH + λ(1 − q)ρ ≤ (1 − λq)ρ0 + λqτ.( 2 1 )
Equation 21 is implied by condition 6. That is, it is always feasible to use a line of credit to withstand
the liquidity shock. Intuitively, the revocability of the line in state λ increases pledgeability, since the
external investor does not beneﬁt from continuation in that state. The main cost of the credit line
comes from its revocability in state L.T h eﬁrm’s payoﬀ becomes:
UNLC
H =( 1 − λ)ρ1 + λ(1 − q)(ρ1 − ρ)+λqτ − I (22)
= UN
H − λq(ρ1 − ρ − τ)
where UN
H i sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n9 . T h et e r mλq(ρ1 − ρ − τ) represents the expected loss from the
revocability of the credit line.
Financing the liquidity merger with the credit line adds one constraint to the problem. In state
(1 − λ)λ, ﬁrm H must have enough liquidity to ﬁnance the bid for ﬁrm L. This requires:
wLC
max +2 ρ0 − pGDLC
0 − δ ≥ ρ + τ (23)
As we show in the appendix, the ﬁrm chooses a credit line wLC
max that is large enough to ensure
that it has enough liquidity to ﬁnance both its own liquidity shock and also the liquidity merger. The
20Notice that this particular formulation assumes that the credit line is paid only in state (1 − λ).T h i si m p l i e st h a t
the interest rate on the drawn portion of the credit line is zero. We note, however, that this formulation is not unique.
It is straightforward (though notationally more cumbersome) to have a positive interest rate on the credit line.
18ﬁrm ﬁnances the credit line by paying the commitment fee in the state in which the credit line is not
used (state (1 − λ)2). As in the no-merger equilibrium, the main cost of the credit line is that it can
be revoked in state λ.T h eﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ becomes:
UMLC
H = UM
H − λq(ρ1 − ρ − τ),( 2 4 )
where UM
H is given by equation 10.
We summarize the results on the credit line implementation in the following proposition (see proof
in Appendix C):
Proposition 3 It is always feasible to use a revocable line of credit to implement ex-ante liquidity
insurance. The amount by which ﬁrm H’s payoﬀ is reduced (the expected loss from the revocability of
the credit line, λq(ρ1−ρ−τ)), is the same both when condition 7 holds, such that the liquidity merger
is not proﬁtable, and when 8 holds, such that the liquidity merger is proﬁtable.
3.2.3. Choosing between cash and lines of credit
The ﬁrm’s choice between cash and credit lines depends on the relative size of the parameters q and ξ.
The main cost of the credit line is the possibility that the line might be revoked in the bad state of the
world, which happens with probability q. While cash holdings can avoid this problem, they require
internal liquidity hoarding whose cost is captured by the parameter ξ. Starting with the equilibrium
with no liquidity mergers, we can show the following intuitive result (see proof in Appendix E):
Proposition 4 Suppose condition 7 holds, such that the liquidity merger is not proﬁtable. There
exists a function qNM(ξ), satisfying q0
NM(ξ) ≥ 0 and qNM(0) = 0, such that if q>q NM(ξ),t h eﬁrm
prefers cash to lines of credit, and if q<q NM(ξ),t h eﬁrm prefers lines of credit to cash.
Figure 2 depicts the function qNM(ξ), and the associated regions in which the ﬁrm prefers cash
or credit lines.
Figure 2 About Here
We can now state one of the main results of the paper (see proof in Appendix F):
Proposition 5 Suppose condition 8 holds, such that the liquidity merger is proﬁtable. There exists a
function qM(ξ), satisfying q0
M(ξ) ≥ 0 and qM(0) = 0, such that: (i) if q>q M(ξ),t h eﬁrm prefers cash
to lines of credit and if q<q M(ξ),t h eﬁrm prefers lines of credit to cash; and (ii) qM(ξ) ≥ qNM(ξ).
In other words, the ﬁrm is more likely to use lines of credit in the liquidity merger equilibrium.
19Figure 2 depicts qM(ξ), showing that the region under which cash dominates the credit line. This
region shrinks as we move from the equilibrium with no mergers to the equilibrium with mergers. In
Figure 2, the triangle marked as E depicts the parameter region in which the ﬁrm would choose cash if
it does not need to ﬁnance a liquidity merger, but a line of credit if there is a need to ﬁnance the merger.
This result shows that ﬁrms are more likely to use lines of credit in the liquidity-merger equilibrium.
The intuition can be stated as follows. The cost of implementing the optimal liquidity policy with cash
holdings is higher in the equilibrium with liquidity mergers, since ﬁrm H must carry more cash in that
equilibrium (CM >C ). The higher required cash balance reduces the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ and tightens the
feasibility constraint. In contrast, the cost of using a line of credit is the same in the two equilibria,
given that the expected loss from the revocability of the credit line is the same (Proposition 3).
Intuitively, since the increase in liquidity needs is concentrated in good states of nature (those in which
the ﬁrm needs to ﬁnance a liquidity merger), the revocability of the credit line does not play a role.21
This makes the line of credit a preferred liquidity instrument in the liquidity merger equilibrium.
4. Extensions
In this section we discuss the role of some of the assumptions that we have made for model tractability.
In some cases, our motivation is to discuss the robustness of the model’s results. In others, extending
the analysis motivates additional implications discussed in Section 5.
4.1. Combining cash and lines of credit
The analysis above assumes that the ﬁrm can use either cash or credit lines to implement ex-ante
liquidity insurance, but not both. Can the ﬁrm beneﬁt from having both cash and a credit line at
t h es a m et i m e ?
The ﬁrst point to note is that such a policy can only beneﬁtt h eﬁrm in the liquidity merger equi-
librium. Suppose condition 7 holds, such that the liquidity merger is not proﬁtable. If q<q NM(ξ),
the ﬁrm prefers lines of credit to cash, despite the excessive liquidation in state λ.H o w e v e r ,i ti sn o t
proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to use cash to decrease the expected loss from revocability, since this would
require the ﬁrm to hold an amount of cash equal to C ( t h es a m ea m o u n tt h a ti tn e e d st oh o l di fi t
chooses only cash to implement liquidity insurance). Similarly, if q>q NM(ξ),t h eﬁrm uses cash and
there is no additional beneﬁt to opening a credit line since the ﬁrm is never liquidated in state λ.
If, in contrast, the ﬁrm must ﬁnance both the liquidity shock and the merger, then there can be a
role for a simultaneous cash/credit line policy. For example, consider the region in which q<q M(ξ),
21In addition, the ﬁrm (and the bank, in equilibrium, as show in Appendix I), has enough pledgeable income to fund
this increase in credit line demand without increasing the cost of the line.
20such that the ﬁrm prefers lines of credit to cash. If it is feasible for the ﬁrm to save enough cash to
ﬁnance the liquidity shock in state λ, then it might be optimal for the ﬁrm to have both cash and a
credit line. We analyze this case in Appendix G. Importantly, we show that allowing for the possibility
of a joint policy does not change the conclusion that the ﬁrm is more likely to use lines of credit in the
liquidity merger equilibrium. This implication could become ambiguous if the joint policy reduced
the parameter region in which the ﬁrm uses credit lines in the liquidity merger equilibrium, relative
to the equilibrium with no mergers (the region in which q<q NM(ξ)) . A tt h es a m et i m e ,w es h o w
t h a tt h ej o i n tp o l i c yc a n n o tb eo p t i m a li fq<q NM(ξ), even in the equilibrium with liquidity mergers.
4.2. Continuum of liquidity shocks
We assumed for simplicity that the liquidity shock had a binomial distribution with mass at ρ and
0. In this case, the model’s logic requires ﬁrm L not to have any liquidity insurance. If ﬁrm L had
enough liquidity to pay for ρ, there would be no liquidity mergers. And if L cannot pay for ρ,t h e r e
is no point in saving any liquidity.
We note that this stark solution is due to the speciﬁc binomial assumption that we used. For
example, we could alternatively assume that the liquidity shock ρ is distributed in a range [0,ρ max].
In this case, a ﬁrm’s optimal liquidity policy states the maximum level of the shock that it can with-
stand. That is, a ﬁrm i saves enough liquidity to withstand shocks below a certain cutoﬀ ρi,w h e r e
i = L,H (see Tirole (2006)). The optimal solution would then have ρL ≤ ρH,g i v e nH’s higher wealth
AH.T h u s ,ﬁrm H would be able to withstand a greater range of liquidity shocks, and ﬁrm L would
also save some liquidity in equilibrium.
Importantly, it would still be the case that ﬁrm H would be the natural acquirer in a liquidity
merger equilibrium. Its higher initial wealth makes it easier for H to save enough liquidity to bid for
L. Notice also that, since ρL ≤ ρH, ﬁrm L is more likely to be ﬁnancially distressed in equilibrium,
increasing the beneﬁt of liquidity hoarding for ﬁrm H. Finally if ﬁrm L is to save liquidity, its priority
would be to survive its liquidity shock rather than being able to bid for the other ﬁrm (which yields
al o w e rp a y o ﬀ due to ﬁrm speciﬁcity).
This analysis suggests the following conjecture. Since ﬁrm L is unlikely to save liquidity for a fu-
ture bid, relatively to ﬁrm H it is less likely to demand a line of credit (which is particularly beneﬁcial
for the ﬁnancing of the merger). While the model above also delivers this implication, it may seem
trivial since ﬁrm L does not demand any liquidity (including cash). The analysis here suggests that
if ﬁrm L is to demand liquidity, its main goal would be to ﬁnance its liquidity shock rather than an
acquisition. Relative to ﬁrm H, ﬁrm L would be less likely to demand a credit line.
214.3. Correlation between liquidity shocks
We assumed that the liquidity shocks were uncorrelated across the two ﬁrms in the industry. This
assumption raises the incidence of liquidity mergers in the model, since it increases the probability of
the state in which only one of the industry ﬁrms has a liquidity shock. If both ﬁrms suﬀer a liquidity
shock, then the liquidity merger is less likely since the industry acquirer becomes more ﬁnancially
constrained.22 However, we note that the model is qualitatively identical if the correlation is positive,
as long as the correlation is less than one. Nothing changes in the model if liquidity mergers are not
proﬁtable, since in this case there is no interaction among ﬁrms. If liquidity mergers are proﬁtable,
they are still most likely to happen (1) in the states of the world in which only some industry ﬁrms
are ﬁnancially distressed, (2) among ﬁrms with industry but not ﬁrm speciﬁc assets, and (3) to be
ﬁnanced by lines of credit.
In addition, recall that we assumed that ﬁrm H did not have enough pledgeable income to bid
for ﬁrm L if both ﬁrms are hit with liquidity shocks. If this assumption is relaxed, liquidity mergers
would happen even in states of the world in which the entire industry suﬀers a liquidity shock. One
interesting possibility is that in this case the role for joint cash and credit line policies (as discussed
in Section 4.1) should increase, since ﬁrm H needs to ﬁnance both its own liquidity shock and the
bid for ﬁrm L. We conclude that allowing for a positive correlation between liquidity shocks would
make liquidity mergers less common, and possibly more costly to ﬁnance. But the main conclusions
of the model would remain the same.
4.4. Aggregate shocks to pledgeability
We assumed that pledgeability of future cash ﬂows (captured by the parameter ρ0) is unchanged
across diﬀerent states of the world in date 1. However, if a ﬁrm enters ﬁnancial distress in times in
which aggregate liquidity is low, it might be more diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to raise external ﬁnancing.
This eﬀect would be at play, for example, if there was an aggregate shock that reduced ρ0 while at
the same time increasing the liquidity shock ρ for all industry ﬁrms.
A correlation between ρ and ρ0 may increase the role for liquidity mergers and liquidity insur-
ance. Notice that the ﬁrm’s internal liquidity sources (such as cash holdings and outstanding lines of
credit) are not necessarily aﬀected by the pledgeability shock, since they oﬀer pre-committed sources
of ﬁnancing. It is interesting to note that there is debate about whether banks renege on their loan
commitments. In the real world, virtually all credit lines have a covenant that gives the bank the right
to revoke the credit facility (the “materially adverse conditions”). Thakor (2005), however, provides
22See Pulvino (1998) for evidence that ﬁnancial constraints increase the likelihood of asset sales to industry outsiders,
particularly in market downturns when industry insiders are less likely to be viable acquirers.
22a theory explaining why banks avoid evoking these clauses too often. By most accounts, the recent
ﬁnancial crisis is seen as an episode where pledgeability was negatively shocked. At the same time, the
existing evidence suggests that banks have largely honored their pre-crisis lines of credit agreements
(see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Campello et al. (2010)).
Thus, the advantage of a liquid industry ﬁrm over an outsider can increase in times of aggregate
liquidity shocks. This analysis suggests that if the correlation among industry ﬁrms’ liquidity shocks
is caused by an aggregate shock that also aﬀects pledgeability, then the negative eﬀect of correla-
tion on liquidity mergers is mitigated. While within-industry correlation hinders liquidity mergers,
economy-wide liquidity shocks can increase the incidence of liquidity mergers.
4.5. Bargaining power
We assumed that in the event of a merger, the acquirer (ﬁrm H) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
ﬁrm L and thus captures the entire rent from the liquidity merger. Clearly, the model’s logic requires
that ﬁrm H has some bargaining power in the event of a merger, or else ﬁrm H will not have incentives
to alter its liquidity policy in the anticipation of a future acquisition opportunity. However, as long
as ﬁrm H retains some bargaining power the model is qualitatively identical.
Given the model’s assumptions, ﬁrm L would not have incentives to change its liquidity policy
in the event that it captures a fraction of the rents. Since this reduces the costs of ﬁnancial distress
for ﬁrm L, its incentives to manage liquidity are even lower in this case. If ﬁrm L also has an active
liquidity management policy (see, e.g., Section 4.2), then more interesting interactions can arise. For
example, L’s incentives to save cash to withstand the liquidity shock would generally decrease as it
captures a greater fraction of the rent. This eﬀect can also change H’s liquidity policy, since it aﬀects
the probability that ﬁrm L is distressed and that a liquidity merger might occur. Our model’s main
conclusions, however, would still carry through.
4.6. Multi-ﬁrm setting
The industry in our benchmark model is composed of one ﬁrm of each type (L and H). In this sim-
pliﬁed structure, ﬁrm H can acquire ﬁrm L whenever H has enough liquidity, and L faces a liquidity
shock (state (1−λ)λ). One concern is whether the model’s results generalize to a multi-ﬁrm setting,
in which the probability of a liquidity merger can depend on the number of potential targets and
acquirers. This section extends our analysis to an industry with multiple ﬁrms of both types.
We assume that the fraction of high wealth ﬁrms (H ﬁrms) in the population is given by the
parameter μ. We maintain the model’s assumptions about pledgeability and net worth (assumptions
4, 5, and 6). Under the assumption of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, there will now be μ(1−λ) ﬁrms
23of type H that do not have a liquidity shock (the potential acquirers), and (1 − μ)λ ﬁrms of type L
that have a liquidity shock and need a liquidity infusion.
We assume that the number of potential acquirers is signiﬁcantly greater than the number of
distressed ﬁrms that require a liquidity infusion. Speciﬁcally, we have:
(1 − μ) <μ (1 − λ).( 2 5 )
This condition captures the notion that the probability of true ﬁnancial distress is likely to be low, and
thus the number of potential targets should not be too high. Notice that this condition will be obeyed
when μ (the fraction of ﬁrms of type H) is large, and/or λ (the probability of a liquidity shock) is small.
We also assume that ﬁrms that are in need for a liquidity infusion (there are (1−μ)λ of those) are
randomly assigned to the μ(1 − λ) potential acquirers. Accordingly, the probability that a potential
acquirer ﬁnds a liquidity merger opportunity is given by
(1−μ)
μ(1−λ)λ. Recall that in the two-ﬁrm version,
if ﬁrm H does not have to ﬁnance a liquidity shock (state 1−λ), the probability of a liquidity merger
is equal to λ (the probability that ﬁrm L has a liquidity shock). Thus, by condition 25, the probability
of a liquidity merger will go down in the multiple-ﬁrm version of the model.
Finally, we assume that ﬁrms of type H continue to capture the entire rent from liquidity mergers.
This may seem a strong assumption given that there is an excess demand for liquidity-driven acquisi-
tions. However, notice that any equilibrium of the model will require ﬁrms of type H to capture some
of the rents from mergers. In order to see this point, suppose that there was an equilibrium in which
L ﬁrms captured all the rents (because there are too many H ﬁrms bidding for them). In this case, H
ﬁrms would not have the ex-ante incentive to build the liquidity that is required to ﬁnance liquidity
mergers. But if those ﬁrms do not have liquidity, they cannot compete for mergers, decreasing the
competition for targets. Thus, an equilibrium with no rent for acquirers cannot exist. As long as H
ﬁrms continue to capture some of the rents, the model would be qualitatively identical (as we discuss
in Section 4.5). This last assumption is used to facilitate the model’s solution (it does not alter the
model’s economic intuition).
Under this set of assumptions, the solution is essentially identical to that described in our base
model, with the key diﬀerence being that from the perspective of each ﬁrm of type H, the probability
of a liquidity merger decreases from (1 − λ)λ to (1 − λ)λ
(1−μ)








<λ ,( 2 6 )
the analysis of the model is identical to that presented above, if we replace the parameter λ with λ
0
.
In terms of the model’s results, the main diﬀerence is that credit lines become less desirable relative
to cash holdings in this multi-ﬁrm setting. The intuition for this result (which we show in Appendix
24H) is as follows. First, given that the probability of a liquidity merger goes down, the amount of
cash that the ﬁr mn e e d st os a v et of u l ﬁll its liquidity needs decreases. Second, while the demand
for the credit line also goes down, this decline does not beneﬁtt h eﬁrm as much as the decline in
cash holdings. The main cost of credit lines is that they may be revoked in the bad state of nature.
However, this cost is independent of the probability of a liquidity merger (which happens when ﬁrm
H is in a good state of nature). It follows that ﬁrms are more likely to choose cash over credit lines
in the model with multiple ﬁrms, because the probability of a liquidity-driven acquisition declines.
Finally, notice that despite the decline in the desirability of credit lines, the model’s predictions
are qualitatively unaﬀected by the probability of liquidity mergers (as we also show in the appendix).
In particular, it is still the case that credit lines are more likely to be used in industries in which
liquidity mergers are more prevalent.
5. Model implications
Our model yields multiple implications. Some of these implications are supported by the available
empirical evidence. Others have not yet been documented and are tested later in the paper. This
section revisits the model, highlighting and recasting the most interesting testable hypotheses coming
out of the analysis.
For ease of reference, we list the main implications of our model:
Implication 1 Liquidity mergers are more likely to occur in industries with high asset speciﬁcity, but
among ﬁrms whose assets are not too ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
This result follows directly from Proposition 1. Notice that this result is independent of how the
liquidity merger is ﬁnanced (ex-post issuance, cash, or lines of credit). The key economic insight
that drives this result is that the industry acquirer has an advantage in liquidity provision to the
distressed ﬁrm because of industry speciﬁcity. If the acquirer has enough liquidity to draw on, the
merger becomes feasible.
How to identify a “liquidity merger” in the data? The model suggests that it is a merger that might
not necessarily happen in the absence of liquidity shocks, but is due to distress in one of the ﬁrms in
an industry and the advantage another ﬁrm has in managing industry-speciﬁc assets. Thus, mergers
and acquisitions of a distressed target by another ﬁrm in the same industry are potential candidates.
Clearly, the liquidity merger can only happen if ﬁrm-level asset speciﬁcity is not too high. In the next
section, we experiment with an identiﬁcation exercise of this type in order to guide our empirical work.
Given that the purpose of liquidity reallocation in our model is to overcome the inability of the
target to raise external funding, one might wonder why we are focusing speciﬁcally on ﬁnancially
25distressed targets, as opposed to targets that are ﬁnancially constrained in a broader sense.23 The
answer is that a target that is constrained but not distressed does not necessarily face the choice
between liquidation and asset sale that we model in the paper. Such a target also has the option
to withstand a liquidity shock by investing less than what it would be optimal in the absence of the
shock, and waiting for the access to external capital to improve. Given that asset reallocations impose
costs due to ﬁrm speciﬁcity, this option should be attractive for a constrained target.
Another key result of the model comes from Proposition 5:
Implication 2 If industry asset speciﬁcity is high and ﬁrm asset speciﬁcity is low, then ﬁrms are
more likely to use lines of credit in their liquidity management.
This result follows from the insight that the line of credit is a particularly attractive way of ﬁ-
nancing growth opportunities that arrive in good states of nature, but that may require liquidity
insurance. A liquidity-driven acquisition is an example of such an investment.24
Section 4 also suggests the following implication:
Implication 3 Liquidity mergers are more likely to occur when there is low correlation between the
liquidity needs of ﬁrms in the industry.
Naturally, measuring this correlation in the data can be challenging. One option is to use a ﬁrm’s
observed external ﬁnancing needs (e.g., investments minus internal funds) as a proxy for ﬁrm-level
liquidity needs (see Acharya et al. (2007) for an empirical proxy). Clearly, the correlation that matters
for the model’s results is that among ﬁrms in the same industry.
The implications above work mostly at the level of the industry. In addition, the model has the
following ﬁrm-level implication:
Implication 4 Within an industry, “deep-pocket” ﬁr m sa r em o r el i k e l yt ou s el i n e so fc r e d i ti nt h e i r
liquidity management.
In the model, the ﬁrm with high initial wealth (ﬁrm H)i sm o r el i k e l yt ou s ec r e d i tl i n e st h a nﬁrm L,
the ﬁrm with low initial wealth. As we discuss in Section 4.2, if ﬁrm L is to demand liquidity insurance,
its main priority is to ﬁnance its own liquidity needs, rather than bids for other industry ﬁrms. Thus,
relatively to ﬁrm H, ﬁrm L is less likely to demand credit lines (and more likely to use cash).
In order to operationalize this result, notice that the ﬁrm’s initial wealth A can be broadly in-
terpreted as the stock of internal funds that the ﬁrm can draw on to decrease its external ﬁnancing
needs. Empirically, A should be correlated with variables such as the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and its stock
23See Almeida et al. (2009) for a discussion of the diﬀerences between ﬁnancial distress and ﬁnancial constraints.
24This implication does not imply that liquidity mergers are ﬁnanced exclusively through credit lines. In the model,
the ﬁrm also issues debt to ﬁnance liquidity mergers, and may also use cash jointly with credit lines (see Section 4.1).
The point is that credit lines are more likely to be used in industries in which liquidity mergers are more prevalent.
26of retained earnings. Thus, this result can help explain the empirical observation that proﬁtable ﬁrms
are more likely to use credit lines in their liquidity management (as reported in Suﬁ (2009)).25 In
addition, we note that one should be careful when using stock variables (such as retained earnings
and net worth) to proxy for A, since these stock variables are partly the result of the ﬁrm’s optimal
policies. For example, Suﬁﬁ nds that net worth (deﬁned as book equity minus cash scaled by assets
minus cash) is negatively correlated with the use of credit lines. One simple explanation for this
correlation is that ﬁr m st h a tu s ec r e d i tl i n e sw i l la l s oh a v eh i g h e rd e b t( g i v e nt h a tc r e d i tl i n ed e b ti s
recorded as debt in COMPUSTAT) and thus lower book equity.
6. Empirical evidence
This section reports tests that focus on the industry-level implications of our model. In particular,
we examine the model’s predictions related to liquidity-driven acquisitions and to the use of lines of
credit that back acquisitions. We ﬁrst describe the sample construction of mergers and lines of credit.
Then, we introduce our proxies for ﬁrm asset speciﬁcity, industry asset speciﬁcity, liquidity mergers,
and line of credit usage. Finally, we document the incidence of liquidity mergers across industries,
the relation between ﬁrm/industry asset speciﬁcity and liquidity mergers, and the relation between
ﬁrm/industry asset speciﬁcity and the use of lines of credit in corporate liquidity management.
6.1. Data description
Our sample of mergers and acquisitions is drawn from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S.
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We obtain accounting and ﬁnancial data on acquirers and targets
from COMPUSTAT. We gather data on domestic mergers and acquisitions with announcement dates
between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2006. Our sample selection process follows the literature
requiring that: (1) the transaction is completed; (2) the number of days between the announcement
and completion dates is between 0 and 1,000; (3) the target is a ﬁrm with accounting data on COM-
PUSTAT or SDC during the time of the takeover; (4) the deal value is greater than $1 million; (5)
the acquiring ﬁrm controls less than 50% of the shares of the target ﬁrm before the announcement;
(6) the acquiring ﬁrm ends up with all the shares of the acquired ﬁrm; and (7) the acquirer and the
target operate in the same industry, deﬁned by 3-digit SIC codes. Due to the need to construct our
proxy for liquidity mergers, we drop all targets that have missing data on interest coverage or negative
interest coverage. The latter cutoﬀ i sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a ts u c ht a r g e t sa r el i k e l yt ob ei ne c o n o m i c ,
rather than ﬁnancial distress. We end up with a sample of 1,097 transactions.
25See also the empirical results below, in particular Tables 7 and 8.
27We use two alternative sources to construct our line of credit data. Our ﬁrst sample (which we
call LPC Sample) is drawn from LPC-DealScan. These data allow us to construct a large sample of
credit line initiations, observing the purpose of each facility. As we explain below, when using these
data we keep in the sample only those credit lines which are likely to be used to ﬁnance investment
and we drop credit agreements that do not correspond to the credit lines characterized by our theory
(for example, those that are used as back ups to commercial paper). We note, however, that the
LPC-DealScan data have two potential drawbacks. First, they are mostly based on syndicated loans,
thus potentially biased towards large deals and consequently towards large ﬁrms. Second, they do not
allow us to measure line of drawdowns (the fraction of existing lines that has been used in the past).
To overcome these issues, we also study an alternative sample that contains detailed information on
the credit lines initiated and used by a random sample of 300 COMPUSTAT ﬁrms between 1996
and 2003. These data are provided by Amir Suﬁ on his website and were used on Suﬁ (2009). We
denote these data Random Sample. Using these data reduces the sample size for our tests and does
not allow us to measure the purpose of the credit line. We regard these two samples as providing
complementary information on the usage of credit lines for the purposes of this paper.
To construct the LPC Sample, we start from a sample of loans in LPC-DealScan in the period of
1987 to 2008 for which we can obtain the ﬁrm identiﬁer gvkey (which we later use to match to COM-
PUSTAT).26 We drop utilities, quasi-public, and ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the sample. We consider only
short-term and long-term credit lines, which are deﬁned as those that have the LPC ﬁeld “loantype”
equal to “364-day facility,” “revolver/line < 1y r ,” “revolver/line >=1y r ,” or “revolver/line.” In
our tests, we keep only the credit lines which are likely to be used for the ﬁnancing of future invest-
ments, namely those whose purpose is labeled “acquisition line,” “capital expenditures,” “corporate
purposes,” or “takeover.”
Our unit of observation for the LPC Sample is a ﬁrm-quarter. In some cases, the same ﬁrm has
more than one credit line initiation in the same quarter. In these cases, we sum the facility amounts
(the total available credit in each line) for each ﬁrm-quarter and average the other variables using the
facility amount as weights. We let AcqLCi,t denote the total value of future investment- (acquisition-)
related credit lines initiated in quarter t by ﬁrm i,a n dl e tMaturityi,t denote the average maturity
of these lines (in quarters).27
To construct the Random Sample, we start from the “random sample” used in Suﬁ (2009), which
contains 1,908 ﬁrm-years (300 ﬁrms) between 1996 and 2003. Suﬁ’s data set includes information on
26We use several procedures to obtain gvkeys, including a ﬁle provided by Michael Roberts, which was used in Chava
and Roberts (2008), ﬁrm tickers (which are available from LPC), and manual matching using ﬁrm names.
27The fraction of credit lines that can potentially be used for capital expenditures and acquisitions is signiﬁcant. Out
of 18,050 unique lines of credit initiated between 1987 and 2008, 9,710 ﬁt LPC’s investment/acquisitions deﬁnition.
28the total credit line facilities available to ﬁrm j in year t (denoted Total Line j,t), and the amount of
credit in these lines that is still available to ﬁrm j in year t (Unused Linej,t). We use this information
to construct our proxies for credit line usage (described below).
6.2. Proxy variables
6.2.1. Identifying liquidity mergers
To identify liquidity-driven acquisitions, we need to stratify the sample according to a measure of
ﬁnancial (not economic) distress. Following Asquith et al. (1984) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998),
we employ interest coverage ratios as a measure of ﬁnancial distress.28 To identify transactions in
which a plausibly economically viable target is close to ﬁnancial distress, we require that the target
ﬁrm has (1) an interest coverage ratio below the median interest coverage ratio in COMPUSTAT
for our sample period, and (2) proﬁtability above the median proﬁtability in COMPUSTAT. We call
this classiﬁcation scheme “Deﬁnition A.” This basic deﬁnition identiﬁes targets that are likely to
be ﬁnancially but not economically distressed, while maintaining a large enough sample of potential
liquidity mergers. However, this classiﬁcation likely captures targets that are not truly distressed.
To reﬁne this deﬁnition, we also consider a classiﬁcation scheme that requires the target to have (1)
interest coverage ratio in the bottom tercile of COMPUSTAT, and (2) proﬁtability above the median
COMPUSTAT proﬁtability (“Deﬁnition B”).
Table 1 reports the number of liquidity-driven and other horizontal deals in our sample by year.
Out of 1,097 control transactions, 260 deals (or about 23.7% of the sample) are classiﬁed as potential
liquidity mergers based on below median interest coverage and above median proﬁtability. Under
the second classiﬁcation scheme, we identify 136 deals (or about 12.4% of the sample). The overall
number of deals in our data set does not increase monotonically through time; for example, it declines
in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s. The fraction of liquidity mergers also varies over time (and
across industries). Finally, we note that the cyclicality of merger events (mergers waves) and hence
the availability of SDC data makes it diﬃcult to identify suﬃc i e n t l ym a n yl i q u i d i t ym e r g e r si ns o m e
of the industries of our sample of manufacturers. Using Deﬁnition A (B) for ﬁnancial distress, we can
identify liquidity mergers in 85 (64) industries at the 3-digit SIC level. To reinforce the results form
these two identiﬁcation schemes, have also computed the fraction of targets with a below investment
grade credit rating in our sample. For the deals classiﬁed as liquidity merger using Deﬁnition A
28We compute interest coverage ratio as COMPUSTAT’s oibdp divided by xint. If COMPUSTAT data are not
available, we use the corresponding data from SDC.
29(Deﬁnition B) where the target has a credit rating, 81% (93%) are rated below investment grade.29
T a b l e1A b o u tH e r e
Table 2 reports basic summary statistics (mean and medians) for empirical proxies related to deal,
acquiring-, and target-ﬁrm characteristics in our sample based on our primary classiﬁcation scheme.
We tabulate characteristics for both liquidity- and non-liquidity-type mergers. Panel A collects sta-
tistics for deal characteristics. It shows that liquidity mergers tend to have a similar transaction value
as non-liquidity mergers in absolute terms. Relative to book assets, liquidity-driven acquisitions are,
however, valued signiﬁcantly lower than non-liquidity-driven acquisitions. Liquidity mergers also take
longer to complete. According to the statistics in Panel B, acquirers in liquidity mergers tend to be
smaller (about two thirds of the size), to hold less cash, to hold more ﬁxed assets, and to be slightly
more proﬁtable than acquirers in non-liquidity mergers. On the ﬂip side, Panel C shows that targets in
liquidity mergers tend to be larger, hold much less cash, and operate more ﬁxed assets than other tar-
gets. Notice in particular that the average proﬁtability of target ﬁr m si sh i g h e rf o rl i q u i d i t ym e r g e r s ,
indicating that the average target in a liquidity merger is not in economic distress. As in prior studies,
acquiring ﬁrms are generally larger than target ﬁrms and tend to have a higher Q than target ﬁrms.
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We measure the incidence of liquidity mergers in an industry using the ratio of liquidity mergers
to the total number of horizontal mergers in that industry. We call this variable Liquidity Mergers.
This variable is summarized in Table 3 below together with the other industry variables.30
6.2.2. Speciﬁcity measures and other industry characteristics
A key element of our theory relates the degree to which assets are ﬁrm- and industry-speciﬁc. The
literature does not oﬀer an empirical counterpart for this element of our model, but we are able to
operationalize a proxy that summarizes the relation we want to capture. Our empirical implementa-
tion is based on two observations. First, we conjecture that industry-speciﬁcity is likely to be greater
for assets such as machinery and equipment than for buildings and land. Accordingly, we deﬁne
“machinery intensity,” the ratio of machinery and equipment (COMPUSTAT’s ppenme) to total ﬁrm
assets (at), as a proxy for industry asset speciﬁcity.31 Second, we conjecture that ﬁrm-speciﬁcity
29In untabulated results, we have also experimented with replacing proﬁtability by equity analyst earnings forecasts.
This alternative classiﬁcation scheme also supports the main results reported in the paper.
30Under Deﬁnition A, the correlation of the components of Transferable Assets is 0.06 (p-value 0.49). The low
correlation suggests that the two components capture diﬀerent aspects of asset transferability.
31We have veriﬁed that our results are robust to the use of alternative deﬁnitions for machinery intensity. For
instance, in untabulated tests we scale ppenme by ppent (i.e., property, plant, and equipment instead of total assets).
We also use a proxy given by 1 — (ppneb + ppneli)/at, where the items in parentheses correspond to buildings and land,
respectively. We decided in favor of our measure of asset industry-speciﬁcity because it maximizes the sample size.
30should be inversely related to the degree of activity in asset resale market in a ﬁrm’s industry: the
higher the use of second-hand capital amongst diﬀerent ﬁrms in an industry, the less ﬁrm-speciﬁci s
the capital. To construct a measure of “capital salability” within an industry, we hand-collect data
for used and new capital acquisitions from the Bureau of Census’ Economic Census. These data are
compiled by the Bureau once every 5 years from 1967 to 1997 and allow us to gauge asset salability
by computing the ratio of used to total (i.e., used plus new) ﬁxed depreciable capital expenditures by
ﬁrms in an industry. The approach follows that of Almeida and Campello (2007).
Combining those two observations, we construct our desired proxy as the product of “machine
intensity” and “capital salability” proxies. Simply put, we multiply the amount of hard assets needed
to operate in an industry by the salability of those assets. As the Bureau of Census’ data end in 1997,
we create a time-invariant variable by averaging across ﬁrms and time within 3-digit SIC industries.32
We call this composite proxy Transferable Assets. We similarly construct proxies for other industry
characteristics that we use as controls in our empirical tests. Industry Concentration is deﬁned as the
3-digit SIC sales-based industry’s Herﬁndahl index. Industry Interest Coverage is deﬁned as the 3-
digit SIC-level average ﬁrm coverage ratio. Industry Capacity Utilization is the 3-digit SIC industry’s
capacity utilization (available from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release G.17), and Industry Q
is the 3-digit SIC-level average ﬁrm Q. In some cases, these industry-level variables contain extreme
observations. To avoid biases due to outliers, these control variables are also winsorized at the 5%
level. The industry-level variables are summarized in Table 3.
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6.2.3. Line of credit usage and other ﬁrm-level data
We follow Suﬁ (2009) in the deﬁnitions of the variables that we use for our credit line tests. Using
COMPUSTAT ﬁelds, we denote by Assets the diﬀerence between total assets (at)a n dc a s h( che).
Tangibility is equal to ppent scaled by Assets. Size is deﬁned as the log of Assets. Q is deﬁned as
a cash-adjusted, market-to-book asset ratio, (Assets + prcc_fc×s h o—c e q )/Assets. NetWorth is de-
ﬁned as (ceq — che)/Assets. Proﬁtability is the ratio of EBITDA over Assets. Age is measured as the
diﬀerence between the current year and the ﬁrst year in which the ﬁrm appeared in COMPUSTAT.
Industry sales volatility (IndSaleVol) is the (3-digit SIC) industry median value of the within-year
standard deviation of quarterly changes in ﬁrm sales (saleq minus its lagged value) scaled by the
average asset value in the year. Proﬁt volatility (ProﬁtVol)i st h eﬁrm-level standard deviation of
annual changes in the level of EBITDA, calculated using four lags, and scaled by average assets in
the lagged period. We winsorize the COMPUSTAT variables symmetrically at the 5% level.
32This index is multiplied by 100 to make magnitudes more comparable to the other industry proxies reported below.
31When using the Random Sample, we measure the fraction of total corporate liquidity that is
provided by credit lines for ﬁrm i in year t using both total and unused credit lines:
Total LC-to-Cash i,t =
Total Linei,t
Total Linei,t + Cashi,t




Unused Linei,t + Cashi,t
.( 2 8 )
As discussed by Suﬁ,w h i l es o m eﬁrms may have higher demand for total liquidity due to better
investment opportunities, these LC-to-Cash ratios should isolate the relative usage of lines of credit
versus cash in corporate liquidity management.
When using the LPC Sample, we construct a proxy for line of credit usage in the following way. For
each ﬁrm-quarter, we measure credit line availability at date t by summing all existing (investment-
purpose) credit lines that have not yet matured. This calculation assumes that lines of credit remain
open until they mature. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne our measure of line of credit availability for each
ﬁrm-quarter (j,s)a s :
Total Acq LCj,s =
X
t≤s
Acq LCj,tΓ(Maturityj,t ≥ s − t),( 2 9 )
where Γ(.) represents the indicator function, and the variables Acq LC and Maturity are deﬁned
above. We convert these ﬁrm-quarter measures into ﬁrm-year measures by computing the average
value of Total Acq LC in each year. We then measure the fraction of corporate liquidity that is
provided by investment-related lines of credit for ﬁrm j in quarter s using the following variable:
Acq LC-to-Cashj,t =
Total Acq LCj,t
Total Acq LCj,t + Cashj,t
.( 3 0 )
This ratio is closely related to the Total LC-to-Cash ratio of equation 27, with the important diﬀerence
that it includes only credit lines that are used for investment purposes.
Table 4 reports summary statistics on ﬁrm-level variables for both samples. Panel A describes the
statistics for the LPC Sample. Panel B describes the Random Sample. The distribution for most of the
variables is very similar across the two samples. The main diﬀerence between the two samples is that
the LPC-DealScan data is biased towards large ﬁrms. For example, median assets are equal to 255
million in the LPC Sample and 116 million in the Random Sample. Consistent with this diﬀerence,
ﬁrms in the LPC Sample are also older, have lower Qs, and lower income volatility. The measure of line
of credit availability in the LPC Sample (Acq LC-to-Cash) is lower than the corresponding measures
in the Random Sample (Total LC-to-Cash and Unused LC-to-Cash). For example, the average value
of Acq LC-to-Cash in the LPC Sample is 0.22,w h i l et h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo fTotal LC-to-Cash is 0.51.
32This diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that the Acq LC-to-Cash measure includes only investment-related
credit lines, and also the possibility that LPC-DealScan may fail to report some credit lines.
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As described above, we use standard proxies for ﬁnancial distress to identify targets that may be
liquidity constrained (targets of liquidity mergers). However, we can use the ﬁnancial data described
in Table 4 to provide additional evidence that targets in the mergers that we identify as liquidity
mergers are short in liquid funds.
We do this by examining the gap between investment plans and available funds for target ﬁrms
prior to the liquidity merger. It is diﬃcult to operationalize this ﬁnancing gap measure since observed
data on investment spending by target ﬁrms (presumably ﬁnancially constrained) will not tell us what
their “unconstrained” plans would look like. As a proxy for those plans, however, we can look at the
investment spending of industry players that are likely to be ﬁnancially unconstrained according to
various criteria used in the literature (see, e.g., Almeida et al. (2004)). We do this by looking at the
ratio of investment expenditures to total assets of same (3-digit SIC) industry ﬁrms that are large
(top quartile of asset size distribution) and have rated bonds; we call this construct TargetInvestment.
We also compute the amount of liquidity in ﬁrms’ balance sheets by looking at the sum of their cash
holdings, total lines of credit, and cash ﬂows (deﬁned as earnings before extraordinary items plus
depreciation) scaled by gross assets; we call this measure ImmediateLiquidity. We then compute the
diﬀerence between ImmediateLiquidity and TargetInvestment,w h i c hw ec a l lLiquiditySurplus.N o -
tably, because large, unconstrained ﬁrms are often more established and in later phases of a ﬁrm’s
lifecycle, it is likely that our measure of unmet ﬁnancial needs will underestimate the real ﬁnancial
needs (or deﬁcits) of targets in a liquidity merger. In addition, notice that the variable Liquidity-
Surplus is expected to be positive for all ﬁrms, since it captures the diﬀerence between stock (cash and
credit lines) and ﬂow variables (capital expenditures). Finally, recall that the credit line variable in the
LPC-Deal Scan sample includes all credit lines (both drawn and undrawn), which is another reason
why LiquiditySurplus may overstate the amount of excess liquidity available to ﬁrms in our sample.
We then compare LiquiditySurplus from targets in liquidity mergers (as identiﬁed by Deﬁnition A
in Table 1), with the mean and median sample values, using the same sample described above in Table
4. We ﬁnd that the median value of LiquiditySurplus for liquidity merger targets is equivalent to 6%
of their assets. In contrast, the median value of LiquiditySurplus for the overall sample is substantially
larger (14% of assets). A comparison of means delivers the same conclusion (12% for liquidity merger
targets versus 18% for the average ﬁrm). Keeping in mind that these are very crude measures of
unmet liquidity needs that are almost certainly overstating the amount of excess liquidity available to
33our sample ﬁrms, they suggest that targets in liquidity mergers are indeed short on liquidity relative
to the typical ﬁrm in our sample.
6.3. The use of lines of credit in merger deals
Before we test our theory, we discuss the relevance of credit lines in terms of their size and in terms
of their use in mergers in the real world. Research on lines of credit is still limited, but recent papers
show that the proportion of lines to total assets is quite signiﬁcant. Evidence in papers like Suﬁ
(2009) and Campello et al. (2010) shows that the ratio of credit lines over total assets hovers around
20-25% in the US. Of this amount, the average ﬁrm draws about 30-35%. The suggestion one gets
from these numbers is that ﬁrms have access to fairly large pools of liquidity that they may use in case
valuable opportunities emerge (including a merger). The average transaction value of liquidity-driven
acquisitions in our sample is $671 million, as shown in Table 2, while the average book value of the
acquiring ﬁrm’s assets is $4.4 billion. To the extent that these acquirers have a ratio of credit lines
over total assets in the 20-25% range, they have, on average, around US$ 1 billion in lines of credit.
These ﬁgures suggest that lines of credit can be a sizable source of funding in acquisitions, a fraction
of which are of the liquidity merger type.
We also look for evidence on whether funds under credit lines are used for acquiring other ﬁrms’
assets. LPC-Dealscan provides information on the purpose of credit lines at origination. In the analy-
sis below, we focus on the set of line facilities that are likely to be used for acquisitions. Speciﬁcally,
this set includes lines whose purpose is listed as “acquisition line,” “takeover,” “capital expenditures,”
or “corporate purposes.” These lines comprise approximately 50% of all credit lines available in LPC-
Dealscan (both in numbers and in value). Naturally, it is possible that some of the credit lines listed
under “capital expenditures” and “corporate purposes” may not be used towards acquisitions. How-
ever, we observe that even the set of credit lines that is speciﬁcally listed as being acquisition-related
is quite sizable. Speciﬁcally, these lines comprise approximately 10% of all lines available in LPC-
DealScan, both in terms of numbers and in terms of total value. This amounts to approximately $ 80
million per ﬁrm-year, or 12% of the size of the annual average dollar amount of liquidity-driven ac-
quisitions in our sample ($671 million). The funds under credit lines that are reserved for acquisitions
in general and hence available for potential liquidity mergers in particular seem signiﬁcant.
To make our point more concretely, we look at the details of ﬁnancing arrangements used in recent
merger deals. There were multiple deals illustrating our paper’s results and we found a deal from our
sample: Western Reﬁning Inc.’s acquisition of Giant Industries Inc. in 2007. The deal was closed at
$1.22 billion in cash in addition to the assumption of $275 million outstanding debt. The transaction
was ﬁnanced in part with $250 million cash and a $500 million credit line facility. The target of
34this deal, Giant Industries, also experienced ﬁnancial distress before the transaction as its capacity
to service debt was strained and resulted in problems with reﬁning operations. Yet another example
is the merger between Cineplex Odeon Corp. and Sony Corp.’s Loews in 1998. The transaction
amounted to over $1 billion in value and was fully ﬁnanced by lines of credit. At that time Cineplex
had breached its debt covenants several times and was in serious need of access to capital to improve.
Finally, one example of a cash-ﬁnanced liquidity merger is the acquisition of Sagent Technology Inc.
by Group 1 Software Inc. in 2003.
Importantly, we note that the model does not predict that all of the funds used in liquidity-
driven acquisitions should come from credit lines; these facilities should just be sizeable enough to
make a diﬀerence in the odds that a liquidity merger takes place. Likewise, our model is not meant to
completely map out the demand for credit lines by ﬁrms. Ample evidence suggests that there are other
ﬁrm-speciﬁc needs motivating the use of credit lines by ﬁrms. One important observation, however, is
that while ﬁrms carry relatively large nominal stocks of credit lines (about 20% of assets), relatively
smaller margins may be really used at any point in time. Given the relatively large size of liquidity
mergers that we document, one could argue that those mergers may move an important margin of the
observed demand for lines. Admittedly, however, ours is just one piece of the story about lines of credit.
6.4. Liquidity mergers and asset speciﬁcity
We start by investigating whether the incidence of liquidity mergers is related to asset speciﬁcity
in a way that is consistent with our model’s prediction. The dependent variable in our analysis is
the ratio of liquidity mergers to the total number of mergers in the industry (the variable Liquidity
Mergers). According to our model, liquidity mergers are more likely to arise in industries with high
asset-speciﬁcity (high machinery intensity), but among ﬁrms whose assets are not too ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(high capital salability). Therefore, the model predicts a positive relation between Liquidity Mergers
and Transferable Assets at the industry level. Our tests control for other industry characteristics
that could aﬀect this relation in the data. Adding Industry Concentration addresses the alterna-
tive explanation that liquidity mergers are simply due to a higher incidence of horizontal mergers in
more concentrated industries (e.g., Hackbarth and Miao (2009)). Similarly, including industry-wide
measures of ﬁnancial distress, measured by Industry Interest Coverage addresses the concern that liq-
uidity mergers are by and large consolidating mergers in distressed industries. Another explanation
of mergers is that they are due to technological industry shocks and excess industry capacity (e.g.,
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Staﬀord (2004), and Harford et al. (2008)). We thus also
control for Industry Capacity Utilization. Finally, we add Industry Q to the empirical speciﬁcation
35to control for overall industry prospects. The empirical model that we estimate has the form:
Liquidity Mergersj = a + b1Transferable Assetsj + b2Industry Concentrationj (31)
+b3Industry Interest Coveragej + b4Industry Capacity Utilizationj
+b5Industry Qj +  j,
where the index j denotes a 3-digit SIC industry. The model is estimated via OLS, but since the
dependent variable is censored between zero and one we also perform Tobit estimations.
Table 5 reports coeﬃcient estimates for a set of regressions in which control variables are pro-
gressively introduced. Consistent with the model, those estimates suggest that the eﬀect of our
asset-speciﬁcity composite on the fraction of liquidity-driven acquisitions is positive and signiﬁcant.
The estimates in column (1) of Panel A, for example, imply that a one-standard deviation change in
Transferable Assets (=0.299) leads to a 0.042 (= 0.141 × 0.299) increase in the fraction of liquidity
mergers in the industry, which is 20.7% of the sample average of liquidity mergers. The economic and
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on Transferable Assets i ss i m i l a r l ys t r o n gw h e nw eu s et h e
deﬁnition of liquidity merger that conditions on both bottom tercile of interest coverage and above
median proﬁtability (Panel B).
Column (2) estimates indicate that market power gains in concentrated industries do not explain
the incidence of liquidity mergers. The industry-wide distress proxy included in the model under
column (3) does not weaken the reliably positive relation between Liquidity Mergers and Transfer-
able Assets. Results in columns (4) and (5) show that industry capacity utilization and Q do not
aﬀect the economic or statistical signiﬁcance of the baseline result of column (1). Next, column (6)
combines all industry-wide proxies we consider. The result from this estimation renders a somewhat
stronger positive relation between Liquidity Mergers and Transferable Assets under both classiﬁcation
schemes. To verify the robustness of our baseline ﬁndings using OLS, we re-estimate the model with
all variables using a median regression in column (7).33 Column (8) points to similar ﬁndings using
a Tobit speciﬁcation.34
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Table 5 shows that liquidity mergers are more frequent in industries in which assets are more
transferable. It does that by comparing the frequency of liquidity-driven to non-liquidity-driven
33In untabulated tests, we have also dropped one observation at a time and re-estimated the model with all variables 83
(63) times in case of Deﬁnition A (Deﬁnition B). These experiments reveal, for example, that the estimated coeﬃcient on
Transferable Assets in case of Deﬁnition A ranges from 0.132 to 0.192, with its t-statistics being between 2.43 and 3.68.
34As an additional robustness check, we redo our tests excluding ﬁrms with a lot of R&D activity (given that it is
plausibly more diﬃcult to measure asset transferability in these industries). In particular, we redo our tests excluding
industries ranked in the top deciles of the COMPUSTAT-based industry rankings for all distress deﬁnitions. All results
are robust to this change in sample deﬁnition.
36acquisitions in diﬀerent industries. An alternative way to provide evidence on the prediction that
liquidity mergers are related to asset speciﬁcity is to compare inter- versus intra-industry mergers.
The logic in the model would suggest that a ﬁnancially distressed target is more likely to be acquired
by another ﬁrm in its industry (given that same-industry ﬁrms are the natural providers of liquidity).
To put this in other terms, intra-industry mergers are more likely to be driven by liquidity motives,
when compared to inter-industry mergers.
To verify whether this is the case, we deﬁne inter-industry mergers as deals between ﬁrms from
two completely diﬀerent industries; i.e., diﬀerent 2-Digit SIC industries. Using otherwise the same
procedures as those listed above, we obtain a sample of 1,281 inter-industry acquisitions in our time
period. We ﬁnd that, in this sample, only 104 (or 8.1%) of ﬁrms that were acquired by industry
outsiders were ﬁnancially distressed according to Deﬁnition A (alternatively, 68 (5.3%) if we use De-
ﬁnition B). Notably, these fractions are signiﬁcantly lower than the ones for intra-industry liquidity
mergers (23.7% according to Deﬁnition A and 12.4% according Deﬁnition B in Table 1). These results
are consistent with the logic our model.
6.5. Mergers and asset speciﬁcity following a liquidity shock
An alternative way to test our model is to look at merger deals that take place following shocks to
liquidity, focusing on the impact of asset speciﬁcity on those deals. The challenge is to empirically
identify a liquidity shock that is not related to the proﬁtability of investment prospects (or underlying
asset values). The shock should be such that there is enough cross-sectional variation left regarding
ﬁrms’ ability to engage in acquisitions (as such, an aggregate decline in demand or credit contraction
may not work). In addition, the shock should aﬀect enough manufacturing industries, which are
required for our measure of industry-but-not-ﬁrm asset speciﬁcity (Transferable Assets).
The collapse of the junk bond markets in the late 1980s eﬀectively meant that junk-bond issuers
lost access to liquidity coming from bonds (they experienced an exogenous shock to the supply of
credit). This happened because of events that were orthogonal to the proﬁtability of their invest-
ment. In particular, new regulatory standards introduced in 1989 precluded ﬁnancial institutions
such as Savings & Loans to acquire junk bonds. In the later part of that same year, Drexel-Burnham-
Lambert, a major operator in the junk bond market arena, was threatened with a RICO indictment
by the SEC. Complications from suspicions about criminal activity at DBL eventually led the ﬁrm
to ﬁle for bankruptcy in February 1990. The combination of these events led to the collapse of the
junk bond markets (as documented in Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). This shock aﬀected ﬁrms across
many diﬀerent industries, with diﬀerent ﬁrms within the same industry being diﬀerentially aﬀected.
To substantiate our baseline results, we study the patterns of mergers and acquisitions involv-
37ing the ﬁr m st h a tw e r ea ﬀected by the junk bond market collapse. Our investigation starts from
the set of bond issuers listed as “below-investment grade” according to Standard & Poor’s long-term
credit rating. As deﬁned by S&P, ﬁr m sr a t e dB B B —o rh i g h e ra r ed e ﬁned as “investment-grade;” ﬁrms
rated BB+ or lower are deﬁned as “below-investment-grade” (or “speculative-grade” or “junk”); ﬁrms
without an S&P rating are excluded from the analysis. Following Lemmon and Roberts (2010), our
sample begins with all ﬁrm-year observations in annual COMPUSTAT database between 1986 and
1993. This yields a balanced time frame around the series of events leading to the demise of the junk
market, as well as a reasonably large sample of ﬁrms potentially aﬀected by this shock. We ﬁnd 509
manufacturers listed as junk-bond issuers in our COMPUSTAT dataset. Of this set, we ﬁnd that 52
ﬁrms eventually become targets ﬁtting the description of “ﬁnancially but not economically distressed”
(under Deﬁnition A) at the time of the control transaction.
We use this sample to provide additional evidence on the predictions of the model. First, we look
at the acquirers’ proﬁles. We ﬁnd that 32 (or 62%) of those targets were acquired by ﬁrms in the
same 3-Digit SIC industry.35 This number seems high, but in the absence of a benchmark it is hard to
ascertain its signiﬁcance. We construct multiple benchmarks by computing the rate of same-industry
acquisitions in two diﬀerent settings: (1) target ﬁrms that are junk-bond issuers outside of the 1989
crisis window; and (2) target ﬁrms that are non-junk-bond issuers during the 1989 crisis window.
These checks are interesting in that they work similarly to “falsiﬁcation tests” for our identiﬁcation
strategy. They give us a sense of the propensity for liquidity mergers to take place following a liquidity
shock relative to the baseline when the liquidity shock did not take place (test (1) is a placebo test),
and relative to counterfactuals that were not aﬀected by the liquidity shock when it happened (test
(2) concerns ﬁrms that were active in 1989, but that were not directly aﬀected by the shock). As a
complement, we also compute the overall sample average of same-industry mergers under Deﬁnition
A (the unconditional probability of a liquidity merger). This latter number might be seen as a more
general comparison benchmark.
The estimates are as follows. During normal times (outside of the 1989 episode), the rate of same-
industry acquisitions of junk-bond issuers that become targets under Deﬁnition A is 37%. The propor-
tion of non-junk-bond issuers under Deﬁnition A that are eventually acquired by same-industry players
following the 1989 episode is 28%. Finally, the overall, unconditional ratio of targets under Deﬁnition
A that are acquired by same-industry players is 43%. While these ratios of liquidity mergers are high
(as expected), we ﬁnd that an acute liquidity event increases those ratios even further. That is, the
liquidity merger phenomenon is particularly accentuated in settings where liquidity shocks are sharp.
As an additional check of our story, we use data from the junk-bond collapse era to re-estimate
35A much smaller number of 14 was acquired by ﬁrms in completely diﬀerent lines of business; i.e., diﬀerent 2-Digit
SIC industries.
38the regressions from Table 5 (which examine the relation between Liquidity Mergers and Transferable
Assets). The results are reported in Table 6. Consistent with the intuition that experimenting with
the salient liquidity shock of the late 1980s might strengthen our model’s identiﬁcation, we ﬁnd eco-
nomically larger eﬀects with comparable statistical signiﬁcance levels despite of the smaller sample.
In particular, the coeﬃcient estimates for Transferable Assets often more than doubles relative to the
baseline estimation results in Table 5. Most of the other (control) variables have coeﬃcient estimates
of similar magnitudes.36
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While the tests of this section pertain to a smaller set of data, they followed a diﬀerent, unique
identiﬁcation strategy. These tests substantiate our model’s prediction that, when faced with liquidity
shocks, ﬁrms may engage in merger deals in which their assets are transferred towards other ﬁrms in
their same industry depending on the level of asset speciﬁcity.
6.6. Lines of credit and asset speciﬁcity
Another implication of our model is that ﬁrms are more likely to use credit lines if industry asset-
speciﬁcity is high, but ﬁrm asset-speciﬁcity is low. We test this implication by relating our three
alternative credit line variables (those in equations 27, 28, and 30) to the composite proxy for industry-
not-ﬁrm speciﬁcity that we constructed, Transferable Assets. We also include in the empirical model
the main determinants of credit line usage suggested by Suﬁ (2009), in addition to the industry
variables that we use in the tests of Section 6.4:
LC-to-Cashi,t = α + β1Transferable Assetsj + β2 ln(Age)i,t + β3(Proﬁtability)i,t−1 (32)
+β4Sizei,t−1 + β5Qi,t−1 + β6NetWorthi,t−1 + β7IndSalVolj,t
+β8ProﬁtVo l i,t + β9Industry Concentrationj
+β10IndustryInterest Coveragej+β11Industry Capacity Utilizationj
+β12Industry Qj +  i,t,
where the index j denotes a 3-digit SIC industry, the index i denotes a ﬁrm, and the index t denotes
a year. Our model predicts that the coeﬃcient β1 should be positive. Since the dependent variable is
censored between zero and one, we also perform Tobit estimations. Because several of the variables
are measured at the industry-level, we cluster standard deviations by 3-digit SIC industry whenever
the industry variables are included in the regression. In other cases, the standard errors are clustered
at the ﬁrm level.
36We further check whether the results in Table 6 change with the inclusion of coverage ratio and leverage as control
variables. We do this to minimize concerns that other correlated ﬁnancial eﬀects (and not asset transferability) might
drive our ﬁndings. Our results remain unchanged (tables available upon request).
39We start by providing some descriptive evidence that shows that the variable Transferable Assets
is positively correlated with line of credit usage in liquidity management, as predicted our model.
This pattern is shown visually in Figure 3, which uses the LPC Sample and depicts the average usage
of credit lines as measured by Acq LC-to-Cash against Transferable Assets, by 3-digit SIC industry.37
The ﬁgure shows that investment-related line of credit usage is more prevalent in industries with
transferable assets.
Figure 3 About Here
In Table 7 we provide the results of estimating equation 32 for the LPC Sample.W es t a r ti nc o l u m n
(1) by running a speciﬁcation that is closely related to that in Suﬁ’s (2009) Table 3.38 In particular,
the coeﬃcients on proﬁtability, size, net worth, and Q are virtually identical to those in Suﬁ (although
the coeﬃcient on proﬁtability is not signiﬁcant in column (1)). These coeﬃcients indicate that large,
low Q,a n dl o wn e tw o r t hﬁrms are more likely to use investment-related credit lines in liquidity
management, relative to cash holdings. In column (2), we run a simple regression of Acq LC-to-
Cash on Transferable Assets. Consistent with Figure 3, the correlation between Acq LC-to-Cash and
Transferable Assets is positive and signiﬁcant. Without controlling for other variables, the coeﬃcient
on Transferable Assets is 0.17,s i g n i ﬁcant at a 1% level. Transferable Assets remains signiﬁcant after
including all ﬁrm-level controls (column (3)); the coeﬃcient drops to 0.09, but remains statistically
signiﬁcant. Column (4) shows that ﬁrms in industries with high capacity utilization, low interest
coverage, and high concentration are more likely to use credit lines relative to cash. In addition,
Transferable Assets remains statistically signiﬁcant and similar in economic magnitude after including
all of these industry controls together with ﬁrm-level variables. Finally, column (5) shows the results
of using a Tobit speciﬁcation. All of the coeﬃcients are consistent with those in the previous columns.
T a b l e7A b o u tH e r e
The relation between Acq LC-to-Cash and Transferable Assets that we estimate in Table 7 also ap-
pears to be economically signiﬁcant. For example, the OLS coeﬃcient on columns (3) and (4) (which
is approximately equal to 0.09) implies that one-standard-deviation increase in Transferable Assets
(which is equal to 0.30 according to Table 3) increases Acq LC-to-Cash by 0.027, or approximately
13% of the mean value of Acq LC-to-Cash (which is 0.21 in Table 4).
One potential concern with these results is that they are based on LPC-DealScan measures of line
of credit availability, which are biased towards larger ﬁrms. Another limitation of these data is that
37To construct the measure of line of credit usage at the industry level, we compute the average value of Acq
LC-to-Cash for each 3-digit SIC industry over the entire sample period. We require a 3-digit SIC industry to have more
than 5 ﬁrms to appear in the ﬁgure.
38In this regression, we follow Suﬁ and also include 1-digit SIC industry dummies. Naturally, we do not include
industry dummies in the speciﬁcations which contain time-invariant industry variables (those in the other columns).
40they tend to overestimate the amount of credit available to ﬁrms (since we cannot measure credit
line drawdowns). To show that the results are not driven by these issues, we experiment with our
Random Sample, which addresses both of these problems. The results are presented in Table 8.
T a b l e8A b o u tH e r e
In the ﬁr s tf o u rc o l u m n so fT a b l e8 ,w eu s et h ev a r i a b l eTotal LC-to-Cash , which includes both
used and unused portions of ﬁrms’ credit lines. Column (1) replicates the results in column (3) of
Suﬁ’s (2009) Table 3. The coeﬃcients indicate that proﬁtable, large, low net worth, low Q,s e a s o n a l ,
and less volatile ﬁrms are more likely to use credit lines in corporate liquidity management.39 In
c o l u m n( 2 )w er e l a t eTotal LC-to-Cash to Transferable Assets, without controlling for other variables.
Consistent with previous results, this column suggests that ﬁrms use more credit lines to manage
liquidity when they belong to industries with ﬁrm-speciﬁc, but transferable assets. Column (3) shows
that this relation continues to hold after controlling for ﬁrm-level variables. Finally, column (4) in-
cludes industry variables and shows that the relation between Total LC-to-Cash and Transferable
Assets continues to hold.
Similarly to Table 7, the results in columns (1) to (5) in Table 8 do not address the potential
overestimation of the amount of credit available to ﬁrms at a point in time, since they use total, as
opposed to unused credit lines. To this end, columns (6) to (10) in Table 8 use Unused LC-to-Cash
and show that this measurement issue does not aﬀect the patterns previously reported. In particu-
lar, Unused LC-to-Cash and Transferable Assets continue to be positively related, before and after
including ﬁrm- and industry-level controls.40 Finally, we note that the economic magnitude of the
correlation between Transferable Assets and credit line usage in this sample is also sizeable. For
example, using the coeﬃcients in columns (4) and (9) to measure this correlation, we ﬁnd that a one-
standard-deviation change in Transferable Assets increases Total LC-to-Cash by 0.10,a n dUnused
LC-to-Cash by 0.08. These magnitudes represent 20% and 18% of their respective sample averages
(see Table 4). These results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.
7. Concluding remarks
While mergers and asset acquisitions are some of the most important types of corporate investment, we
know relatively little about the way ﬁrm ﬁnancial policies are aﬀected by those transactions. Likewise,
we know little about how real asset allocations across ﬁrms are aﬀected by corporate ﬁnancial policies.
Our paper sheds light on these issues by modeling the interaction between corporate liquidity and
39Note that the positive relation between proﬁtability and LC-to-Cash is consistent with Implication 4 of the theory.
40Column (5) replicates the results in column (5) of Table 3 in Suﬁ (2009).
41asset reallocation opportunities. The model embeds the Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997, 1998) liquidity
demand theory in an industry equilibrium framework that draws on Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
Our model implies that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms might be acquired by other ﬁrms in the same
industry, even when there are no operational synergies. We call such transactions “liquidity merg-
ers.” The main purpose of these deals is to reallocate liquidity from ﬁrms that have liquidity to those
that may be ineﬃciently liquidated due to a liquidity shortfall. Analyzing ﬁrms’ optimal liquidity
policies as a function of future real asset reallocation opportunities, we ﬁnd that lines of credit are a
particularly attractive way of ﬁnancing liquidity-driven acquisitions. This theoretical ﬁnding is inter-
esting because it provides a rationale to the (“counterintuitive”) empirical regularity that proﬁtable,
well-capitalized ﬁrms as the heaviest users of credit line facilities.
Besides shedding new light on existing empirical ﬁndings, our model has several implications that
have not yet been examined. For example, our model predicts that liquidity mergers should be more
prevalent in industries with high asset speciﬁcity, but among ﬁrms whose assets are not too ﬁrm-
speciﬁc. The model also predicts that ﬁrms in these industries should be more likely to use lines of
credit, generating an equilibrium relation between line of credit usage and the incidence of liquidity
mergers. We put together a comprehensive data set to explore our model’s empirical implications and
ﬁnd evidence that supports those implications. Our empirical tests are, by design, quite basic and
meant to motivate future research on the link between mergers and corporate ﬁnancial policies, with
an emphasis on the management of liquid instruments such as cash and lines of credit.
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Fig. 2. The choice between cash and credit lines. This gure depicts the functions qNM() and qM()
from Propositions 4 and 5. These functions are such that, for a pair (q;) such that q > q(), rm H
chooses cash rather than credit lines to implement the optimal liquidity policy. Similarly, for q < q(),
rm H prefers credit lines to cash. The function qNM() depicts this threshold for the equilibrium
without a liquidity merger, while the function qM() depicts this threshold for the equilibrium with
liquidity mergers. The region E is the region in which rm H chooses cash if liquidity mergers are
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Transferable Assets
Fig. 3. Line of credit availability and transferable assets. The ﬁgure depicts the relationship between
line of credit availability and our composite proxy for industry, and not ﬁrm speciﬁcity (Transferable
Assets). On the y-axis, we depict the ratio of total credit lines divided by total credit lines plus cash
balances (the variable Acq LC-to-Cash in equation 32 in the text). On the x-axis, we depict the
variable Transferable Assets. The data represent 3-digit SIC industry averages over our entire
sample period (1987—2008), for industries with ﬁve or more ﬁrms.
47Table 1
Sample distribution by announcement year
The sample contains all domestic mergers and acquisitions with announcement dates between January 1, 1980 and
December 31, 2006 (see text for further details). A liquidity merger is deﬁn e da sam e r g e ro ra c q u i s i t i o ni nw h i c h
the target has interest coverage below the sample median and proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT
(Deﬁnition A) or as a merger or acquisition in which the target has interest coverage below the sample 33rd percentile and
proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT (Deﬁnition B). Interest coverage is computed as COMPUSTAT’s
oibdp divided by xint and proﬁtability is the ratio of oibdp over at. If COMPUSTAT data are not available, we use the
corresponding data items from SDC.
Announcement Liquidity Merger (Def. A) Liquidity Merger (Def. B) All Mergers
Year Yes No Yes No
1980 2 8 0 10 10
1981 10 14 6 18 24
1982 7 20 4 23 27
1983 7 15 4 18 22
1984 9 15 3 21 24
1985 11 17 6 22 28
1986 10 33 3 40 43
1987 11 28 5 34 39
1988 15 39 10 44 54
1989 14 30 5 39 44
1990 10 18 8 20 28
1991 6 20 4 22 26
1992 6 17 3 20 23
1993 7 24 5 26 31
1994 10 31 4 37 41
1995 12 28 3 37 40
1996 8 35 7 36 43
1997 7 56 5 58 63
1998 15 62 6 71 77
1999 17 66 6 77 83
2000 16 62 8 70 78
2001 12 39 7 44 51
2002 9 19 2 26 28
2003 11 28 10 29 39
2004 6 28 5 29 34
2005 3 40 3 40 43
2006 9 45 4 50 54
Total 260 837 136 961 1,097
48Table 2
Summary statistics for control transactions
This table reports means and medians for empirical proxies related to deal, acquiring-, and target-ﬁrm characteristics.
The sample contains all domestic mergers and acquisitions with announcement dates between January 1, 1980 and
December 31, 2006 (see text for further details). A liquidity merger is deﬁn e da sam e r g e ro ra c q u i s i t i o ni nw h i c ht h e
target has interest coverage below the sample median and proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT.
Transaction Value ($ million) is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses.
Assets is deﬁned as total book value of assets. Days To Completion is measured as the number of calendar days between
the announcement and eﬀective dates. Cash includes cash and marketable securities. EBIT equals cash ﬂow minus





Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Transaction Value (TV) 670.58 784.82 770.52
[125.25] [97.90] [100.60]
TV/Assets 1.08 2.36 2.17
[0.66] [1.19] [1.13]
Days To Completion 146.28 118.63 122.09
[121] [102] [106]
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics
Assets 4,380.8 6,248.9 6,120.0
[1,155.5] [1,125.0] [1,117.8]
Cash/Assets (%) 9.98 14.82 14.30
[3.70] [8.15] [7.66]
EBIT/Assets ( % ) 9 . 6 57 . 0 77 . 3 7
[9.37] [9.55] [9.57]
Return On Assets (%) 13.28 11.05 11.31
[12.89] [13.52] [13.51]
PPE/Assets (%) 28.66 23.49 24.04
[26.17] [20.10] [20.52]
Q 1.54 2.39 2.31
[1.33] [1.72] [1.65]
Panel C: Target Characteristics
Assets 801.69 619.92 646.23
[234.45] [89.21] [100.8]
Cash/Assets (%) 5.58 17.72 15.82
[2.02] [9.49] [6.46]
EBIT/Assets ( % ) 9 . 7 02 . 9 13 . 9 9
[8.40] [6.08] [7.24]
Return On Assets (%) 14.99 7.87 9.04
[13.50] [11.04] [11.99]
PPE/Assets (%) 30.14 26.42 27.30
[29.10] [23.44] [24.61]
Q 1.35 1.99 1.84
[1.19] [1.40] [1.33]
49Table 3
Summary statistics for industry-level variables
This table reports summary statistics for time-invariant proxies of industry characteristics during the 1980—2006 period.
A liquidity merger is deﬁned as a merger or acquisition in which the target has interest coverage below the sample
median and proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT (Deﬁnition A) or as a merger or acquisition in
which the target has interest coverage below the sample 33rd percentile and proﬁtability above the sample median in
COMPUSTAT (Deﬁnition B). Liquidity Mergers is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s ratio of liquidity mergers to
the total number of horizontal mergers in that industry between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2006 (see text for
further details). Transferable Assets is deﬁned as machine intensity (ppenme/at) multiplied by 100 times the ratio of
used divided by used plus new capital, from the Bureau of Census’ Economic Census. Industry Concentration is deﬁned
as the 3-digit SIC industry’s Herﬁndahl index (based on sales). Industry Interest Coverage is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s average interest coverage. Industry Capacity Utilization is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s capacity
utilization, which is available from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release G.17. Industry Q is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s average Q. All variables are time-invariant industry-level averages and winsorized at the 5% level.
Mean Median Std. Dev. 25
th Pct. 75
th Pct. Obs.
P a n e lA :D e f .A
Liquidity Mergers 0.204 0.167 0.125 0.104 0.273 85
Transferable Assets 0.397 0.326 0.299 0.183 0.486 85
Industry Concentration 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.012 85
Industry Interest Coverage 28.11 23.16 21.11 14.53 36.92 85
Industry Capacity Utilization 0.788 0.782 0.028 0.765 0.808 83
Industry Q 3.306 1.832 3.393 1.375 3.206 85
P a n e lB :D e f .B
Liquidity Mergers 0.142 0.111 0.096 0.071 0.200 64
Transferable Assets 0.405 0.357 0.307 0.191 0.483 64
Industry Concentration 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.010 64
Industry Interest Coverage 27.685 22.778 21.763 14.053 36.897 64
Industry Capacity Utilization 0.786 0.776 0.027 0.765 0.808 63
Industry Q 3.251 1.951 3.048 1.464 3.616 64
50Table 4
Summary statistics for ﬁrm-level variables
This table reports basic summary statistics for time-variant proxies of ﬁrm characteristics during the 1987—2008 period.
Acq LC-to-Cash is deﬁned as the fraction of corporate liquidity that is provided by investment-related lines of credit.
Assets are ﬁrm assets net of cash, measured in millions of dollars. Tangibility is PPE over assets. Q is deﬁn e da sac a s h -
adjusted, market-to-book assets ratio. NetWorth is the book value of equity minus cash over total assets. Proﬁtability is
the ratio of EBITDA over net assets. Industry sales volatility (IndSaleVol) is the (3-digit SIC) industry median value of
the within-year standard deviation of quarterly changes in ﬁrm sales, scaled by the average quarterly gross asset value
in the year. ProﬁtVol is the ﬁrm-level standard deviation of annual changes in the level of EBITDA, calculated using
four lags, and scaled by average gross assets in the lagged period. Firm Age is measured as the diﬀerence between the
current year and the ﬁrst year in which the ﬁrm appeared in COMPUSTAT. Unused LC-to-Cash and Total LC-to-Cash
measure the fraction of total corporate liquidity that is provided by credit lines using unused and total credit lines.




Acq LC-to-Cash 0.215 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.394 22,333
Tangibility 0.310 0.281 0.176 0.175 0.414 20,955
Assets 2392.38 255.19 12841.67 53.71 1081.43 20,968
Q 1.985 1.498 1.302 1.130 2.267 19,231
NetWorth 0.360 0.393 0.268 0.228 0.550 20,955
Proﬁtability 0.134 0.141 0.122 0.086 0.202 20,913
IndSalVol 0.038 0.033 0.023 0.025 0.043 22,589
ProﬁtVol 0.066 0.049 0.052 0.027 0.089 22,593
Age 19.435 14.000 15.525 7.000 31.000 22,593
Random Sample (Suﬁ (2009) sample):
Unused LC-to-Cash 0.450 0.455 0.373 0.000 0.822 1,906
Total LC-to-Cash 0.512 0.569 0.388 0.000 0.900 1,908
Tangibility 0.332 0.275 0.230 0.146 0.481 1,908
Assets 1441.41 116.41 7682.26 23.98 522.20 1,908
Q 2.787 1.524 3.185 1.069 2.726 1,905
NetWorth 0.426 0.453 0.300 0.284 0.633 1,905
Proﬁtability 0.015 0.126 0.413 0.040 0.198 1,908
IndSalVol 0.043 0.036 0.026 0.024 0.051 1,908
ProﬁtVol 0.089 0.061 0.078 0.028 0.126 1,908
Age 16.04 10.00 13.40 6.00 23.00 1,908
51Table 5
Liquidity mergers and transferable assets
The dependent variable Liquidity Mergers is the fraction of liquidity mergers by 3-digit SIC industry as a fraction of the
total number of mergers in that industry between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2006 (see text for further details).
A liquidity merger is deﬁned as a merger or acquisition in which the target has interest coverage below the sample median
and proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT (Panel A) or as a merger or acquisition in which the target
has interest coverage below the sample 33rd percentile and proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT
(Panel B). Interest coverage is computed as oibdp divided by xint. If COMPUSTAT data are not available, we use the
corresponding data items from SDC. Transferable Assets is deﬁned as machine intensity (ppenme/at), multiplied by
100 times the ratio of used divided by used plus new capital, from the Bureau of Census’ Economic Census. Industry
Concentration is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s Herﬁndahl index (based on sale). Industry Interest Coverage is
deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s average interest coverage. Industry Capacity Utilization is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s capacity utilization, which is available from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release G.17. Industry Q is
deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s average Q. All variables are time-invariant industry-level averages and winsorized
at the 5% level. *, **, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and t-statistics based on
robust standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P a n e lA :D e f .A
Transferable Assets 0.141*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.139*** 0.129** 0.165*** 0.239*** 0.170***
(2.66) (3.13) (2.84) (2.70) (2.22) (3.03) (4.06) (3.99)
Industry Concentr. 4.562*** 5.087*** 3.588 5.453***
(3.45) (3.32) (1.62) (3.38)
Industry Int. Cov. -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(1.45) (1.78) (1.02) (1.47)
Industry Cap. Util. 0.871* 1.085** 0.820 1.112**
(1.78) (2.21) (1.36) (2.50)
Industry Q -0.008** -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(2.01) (1.07) (1.05) (1.14)
Constant 0.148*** 0.090*** 0.165*** -0.539 0.178*** -0.730* -0.548 -0.763**
(6.52) (3.44) (5.82) (1.42) (5.58) (1.89) (1.13) (2.13)
Speciﬁcation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Median Tobit
Observations 85 85 85 83 85 83 83 83
R
2 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.17 0.35
P a n e lB :D e f .B
Transferable Assets 0.096** 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.101** 0.088** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.140***
(2.36) (2.81) (3.24) (2.51) (2.08) (4.02) (3.20) (4.21)
Industry Concentr. 4.219*** 4.187*** 4.021** 4.506***
(3.28) (3.07) (2.19) (3.53)
Industry Int. Cov. -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002***
(2.50) (3.08) (1.18) (3.36)
Industry Cap. Util. 0.551 0.701* 0.286 0.748**
(1.19) (1.68) (0.59) (2.02)
Industry Q -0.008** -0.006* -0.005 -0.006*
(2.27) (1.94) (0.93) (1.71)
Constant 0.103*** 0.054** 0.129*** -0.335 0.133*** -0.444 -0.163 -0.489
(5.68) (2.58) (6.00) (0.93) (5.63) (1.36) (0.42) (1.66)
Speciﬁcation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Median Tobit
Observations 64 64 64 63 64 63 63 63
R
2 0.09 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.41 0.19 0.34
52Table 6
Liquidity mergers and transferable assets after a liquidity shock
The tests in this table are based on the set of bond issuers listed as “below-investment grade” according to Standard &
Poor’s long-term credit rating between 1986 and 1993; ﬁrms without an S&P rating are excluded from the analysis. The
dependent variable Liquidity Mergers is the fraction of liquidity mergers by 3-digit SIC industry as a fraction of the total
number of mergers in the sample for that industry after 1989 (see text for further details). A liquidity merger is deﬁned
as a merger or acquisition in which the target has interest coverage below the sample median and proﬁtability above the
sample median in COMPUSTAT (Panel A) or as a merger or acquisition in which the target has interest coverage below
the sample 33rd percentile and proﬁtability above the sample median in COMPUSTAT (Panel B). Interest coverage
is computed as oibdp divided by xint. If COMPUSTAT data are not available, we use the corresponding data items
from SDC. Transferable Assets is deﬁned as machine intensity (ppenme/at), multiplied by 100 times the ratio of used
divided by used plus new capital, from the Bureau of Census’ Economic Census. Industry Concentration is deﬁned
as the 3-digit SIC industry’s Herﬁndahl index (based on sale). Industry Interest Coverage is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s average interest coverage. Industry Capacity Utilization is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s capacity
utilization, which is available from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release G.17. Industry Q is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s average Q. All variables are time-invariant industry-level averages and winsorized at the 5% level. *, **,
and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and t-statistics based on robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P a n e lA :D e f .A
Transferable Assets 0.498*** 0.560*** 0.487*** 0.482*** 0.542*** 0.465** 0.740** 0.474**
(3.21) (3.56) (3.04) (2.79) (2.85) (2.28) (2.07) (2.47)
Industry Concentr. 17.217** 25.306*** 31.524** 26.529***
(2.57) (3.00) (2.53) (3.69)
Industry Int. Cov. 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.26) (0.86) (0.80) (1.17)
Industry Cap. Util. 0.804 1.266 2.621 1.339
(0.56) (0.81) (1.15) (1.10)
Industry Q -0.019 -0.004 0.011 -0.003
(1.42) (0.36) (0.52) (0.26)
Constant 0.402*** 0.231*** 0.383*** -0.228 0.451*** -0.852 -2.202 -0.940
(6.65) (3.12) (3.82) (0.20) (5.83) (0.66) (1.17) (0.93)
Speciﬁc a t i o n O L SO L SO L SO L SO L S O L S M e d i a n T o b i t
Observations 35 35 35 34 35 34 34 34
R
2 0.14 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.45
P a n e lB :D e f .B
Transferable Assets 0.461** 0.574*** 0.452** 0.442* 0.643** 0.520* 0.325** 0.554**
(2.35) (3.06) (2.23) (1.91) (2.62) (2.05) (2.53) (2.33)
Industry Concentr. 14.916** 23.535*** 28.192 24.411***
(2.23) (3.01) (1.70) (2.97)
Industry Int. Cov. 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.19) (0.77) (0.09) (1.24)
Industry Cap. Util. 3.562** 3.819** 4.866 4.030**
(2.41) (2.24) (1.48) (2.39)
Industry Q -0.035* -0.005 -0.017 -0.006
(1.84) (0.24) (0.40) (0.33)
Constant 0.372*** 0.202* 0.354*** -2.422* 0.430*** -2.911* -3.632 -3.106**
(4.61) (1.94) (2.88) (2.06) (3.99) (2.04) (1.33) (2.26)
Speciﬁc a t i o n O L SO L SO L SO L SO L S O L S M e d i a n T o b i t
Observations 26 26 26 25 26 25 25 25
R
2 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.48 0.29 0.36
53Table 7
Line of credit availability and transferable assets
The dependent variable is Acq LC-to-Cash, the fraction of corporate liquidity that is provided by investment-related
lines of credit. The data for lines of credit come from LPC DealScan, for the period of 1987 to 2008. Proﬁtability is
the ratio of EBITDA over net assets. Tangibility is PPE over assets. Assets are ﬁrm assets net of cash, measured in
millions of dollars. NetWorth is the book value of equity minus cash over total assets. Q is deﬁned as a cash-adjusted,
market-to-book assets ratio. Industry sales volatility (IndSaleVol) is the (3-digit SIC) industry median value of the
within-year standard deviation of quarterly changes in ﬁrm sales, scaled by the average quarterly gross asset value in
the year. ProﬁtVol is the ﬁrm-level standard deviation of annual changes in the level of EBITDA, calculated using
four lags, and scaled by average gross assets in the lagged period. Firm Age is measured as the diﬀerence between the
current year and the ﬁrst year in which the ﬁrm appeared in COMPUSTAT. Transferable Assets is deﬁned as machine
intensity (ppenme/at) multiplied by 100 times the ratio of used divided by used plus new capital, from the Bureau of
Census’ Economic Census. Industry Concentration is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s Herﬁndahl index (based on
sales). Industry Interest Coverage is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s average interest coverage. Industry Capacity
Utilization is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s capacity utilization, which is available from the Federal Reserve’s
Statistical Release G.17. Industry Q is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s average Q. *, **, and *** denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Dep. Var.: Acq LC-to-Cash (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transferable Assets 0.165*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.135**
(4.23) (3.14) (3.10) (2.12)
Proﬁtability 0.027 0.0049 0.013 0.226**
(0.84) (0.17) (0.38) (2.07)
Tangibility -0.039 -0.033 -0.059* -0.207**
(1.29) (1.00) (1.89) (2.43)
Assets 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.092***
(7.43) (6.73) (6.71) (9.81)
NetWorth -0.100*** -0.095*** -0.093*** -0.266***
(5.63) (4.89) (4.96) (4.88)
Q -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.094***
(14.51) (12.28) (11.85) (9.73)
IndSalVol 0.336 0.382 0.237 0.242
(1.58) (1.50) (0.87) (0.36)
ProﬁtVol -0.181** -0.150* -0.108 0.108
(2.00) (1.79) (1.24) (0.43)
Age -0.018** -0.019** -0.019** -0.054**
(2.33) (2.22) (2.23) (2.55)
Industry Concentration 3.171*** 7.291***
(2.97) (3.42)
Industry Interest Coverage -0.001*** -0.001**
(2.66) (2.14)
Industry Capacity Utilization 0.512** 0.848
(2.19) (1.51)
Industry Q -0.001 -0.003
(0.65) (0.69)
Constant 0.261*** 0.162*** 0.218*** -0.167 -1.717***
(8.47) (8.04) (6.27) (0.90) (3.90)
Cluster Firm Industry Industry Industry Industry
Industry Dummies? Yes No No No No
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Speciﬁcation OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit
Observations 19,034 22,333 19,034 18,922 18,922
R
2 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.07
54Table 8
Line of credit availability and transferable assets: random sample
The dependent variables are Total LC-to-Cash and Unused LC-to-Cash, which measure the fraction of total corporate
liquidity that is provided by credit lines using total and unused credit lines respectively. The data for lines of credit are
provided by Amir Suﬁ, for the period of 1996 to 2003. Proﬁtability is the ratio of EBITDA over net assets. Tangibility
is PPE over assets. Assets are ﬁrm assets net of cash, measured in millions of dollars. NetWorth is the book value of
equity minus cash over total assets. Q is deﬁned as a cash-adjusted, market-to-book assets ratio. Industry sales volatility
(IndSaleVol) is the (3-digit SIC) industry median value of the within-year standard deviation of quarterly changes in
ﬁrm sales, scaled by the average quarterly gross asset value in the year. ProﬁtVol is the ﬁrm-level standard deviation
of annual changes in the level of EBITDA, calculated using four lags, and scaled by average gross assets in the lagged
period. Firm Age is measured as the diﬀerence between the current year and the ﬁrst year in which the ﬁrm appeared
in COMPUSTAT. Transferable Assets is deﬁned as machine intensity (ppenme/at) multiplied by 100 times the ratio of
used divided by used plus new capital, from the Bureau of Census’ Economic Census. Industry Concentration is deﬁned
as the 3-digit SIC industry’s Herﬁndahl index (based on sales). Industry Interest Coverage is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s average interest coverage. Industry Capacity Utilization is deﬁned as the 3-digit SIC industry’s capacity
utilization, which is available from the Federal Reserve’s Statistical Release G.17. Industry Q is deﬁned as the 3-digit
SIC industry’s average Q. *, **, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and t-statistics
based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A — Dep. Var.: Total LC-to-Cash (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transferable Assets 0.723*** 0.318** 0.321** 0.353**
(4.39) (2.33) (2.20) (2.07)
Proﬁtability 0.078** 0.067* 0.082*** 0.266***
(2.27) (1.97) (2.69) (3.52)
Tangibility 0.040 0.104 0.097 0.173
(0.56) (1.17) (1.12) (1.43)
Assets 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.052***
(5.12) (3.30) (3.23) (3.50)
NetWorth -0.097** -0.185*** -0.173*** -0.233**
(2.30) (3.06) (3.17) (2.51)
Q -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.066***
(8.51) (8.83) (8.64) (7.61)
IndSalVol 1.094* 1.301 1.630* 2.314**
(1.69) (1.49) (1.84) (2.26)
ProﬁtVol -0.596*** -0.550* -0.489* -0.338
(3.22) (1.85) (1.88) (0.90)
Age -0.039* -0.047* -0.040 -0.059*
(1.85) (1.75) (1.58) (1.88)
Industry Concentration 1.229 0.459
(0.37) (0.12)
Industry Interest Coverage -0.002* -0.002**
(1.88) (2.08)
Industry Capacity Utilization 1.046 1.119
(1.08) (1.00)
Industry Q 0.001 0.002
(0.14) (0.26)
Constant 0.239** 0.272*** 0.524*** -0.299 -0.530
(2.42) (4.46) (4.91) (0.38) (0.59)
Cluster Firm Industry Industry Industry Industry
Industry Dummies? Yes No No No No
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Speciﬁcation OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit
Observations 1,905 900 900 900 900
R
2 0.40 0.11 0.40 0.41 0.37
55Panel B — Dep. Var.: Unused LC-to-Cash (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transferable Assets 0.645*** 0.260** 0.254* 0.289*
(4.13) (2.05) (1.91) (1.84)
Proﬁtability 0.061* 0.044 0.059** 0.252***
(1.96) (1.48) (2.17) (3.55)
Tangibility 0.025 0.079 0.071 0.127
(0.37) (0.90) (0.82) (1.01)
Assets 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.061***
(6.12) (3.81) (3.68) (4.15)
NetWorth -0.054 -0.138*** -0.127*** -0.165*
(1.40) (2.87) (2.88) (1.86)
Q -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.061***
(7.28) (9.35) (9.07) (7.71)
IndSalVol 1.042 1.051 1.285 1.948*
(1.55) (1.20) (1.40) (1.82)
ProﬁtVol -0.554*** -0.541** -0.479** -0.357
(3.17) (2.01) (2.09) (0.99)
Age -0.023 -0.044* -0.037 0.057*
(1.13) (1.68) (1.51) (1.79)
Industry Concentration 1.444 0.717
(0.42) (0.18)
Industry Interest Coverage -0.002* -0.002**
(1.85) (2.01)
Industry Capacity Utilization 0.977 1.062
(0.97) (0.91)
Industry Q -0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.12)
Constant 0.148 0.244*** 0.428*** -0.330 -0.580
(1.38) (4.22) (4.52) (0.40) (0.62)
Cluster Firm Industry Industry Industry Industry
Industry Dummies? Yes No No No No
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Speciﬁcation OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit
Observations 1,903 900 900 900 900
R
2 0.37 0.10 0.39 0.40 0.36
56Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose condition 7 holds. To prove the proposed equilibrium, let us analyze what happens in each
state at date 1, given the proposed liquidity policies. Then we will show that ﬁrms do not beneﬁt
from deviating from the optimal liquidity policies at date 0.
In state (1−λ)2,b o t hﬁrms continue since they do not need additional liquidity. In state (1−λ)λ,
only ﬁrm L has a liquidity shock, and it is liquidated. Firm H continues, but does not bid for L.I n
state λ(1 − λ),o n l yﬁrm H has a liquidity shock. It can ﬁnance its liquidity shock and continues.
Finally, in state λ2 both ﬁrms have a liquidity shock. Firm H can continue, while ﬁrm L is liquidated.
These strategies generate enough date-0 pledgeable income for investors, so that projects can start.
Consider ﬁrst ﬁrm L.I tm a k e sKL
0 = I−AL ( s ot h a ti tc a nﬁnance the initial investment), KL
1,λ = −τ
(liquidation or merger proceeds are fully pledged to external investors), and a payment KL
2,(1−λ) such
that investors break even from the perspective of date 0. This payment must be such that:
I − AL =( 1− λ)pGKL
2,(1−λ) + λτ.( 3 3 )
Equation 5 guarantees that we can ﬁnd a KL
2,(1−λ) such that pGKL
2,(1−λ) ≤ ρ0, thereby satisfying the
pledgeability constraint.41
Firm H’s optimal investment policy is to start its own project at date 0 and reinvest ρ in state λ
at date 1 (so that it continues until the ﬁnal date). In order to support this policy, ﬁrm H borrows
suﬃcient funds to start the project at date 0 (KH
0 = I −AH), and receives an additional payment of
ρ from external investors in state λ (KH
1,λ = ρ). It promises a date-2 payment K2 (in both states), so
that investors break even. This payment is such that:
I − AH + λρ = pGK2. (34)
Equation 6 guarantees that this payment satisﬁes the pledgeability constraint.
Are these strategies optimal given the other ﬁrm’s strategy? By condition 4, it is eﬃcient for
both ﬁrms to withstand the liquidity shock. Firm L would beneﬁt from saving more liquidity to
withstand its own shock, but it is constrained by its low net worth AL (condition 5). Formally, since
ρ0 − λρ < I − AL, one cannot ﬁnd a date-2 payment KL
2 ≤
ρ0
pG such that I − AL + λρ = pGKL
2 .
Firm H could deviate from the equilibrium strategy by bidding for ﬁrm L. However, condition 7
implies that it does not pay for ﬁrm H to deviate. H needs to pay a minimum price of τ to ﬁrm L’s
investors, and ﬁnance L’s liquidity shock, ρ. Because the maximum that it can generate out of ﬁrm
L’s assets is ρ1 − δ, bidding is not proﬁtable for ﬁrm H.T h u s ,n oﬁrm beneﬁts from deviating from
the equilibrium strategies.
Now suppose condition 8 holds. Given the proposed ﬁnancial policies, in state λ2 ﬁrm H would
beneﬁt from bidding for the assets of ﬁrm L, but does not have enough liquidity to ﬁnance the bid.
In state (1 − λ)λ, ﬁrm H does not have a liquidity shock, and uses its liquidity ρ + τ to bid for the
assets of ﬁrm L. Given 8, the liquidity merger is eﬃcient since ﬁrm H can generate ρ1 − δ from the
assets of ﬁrm L.F i r m H pays the liquidation value τ to ﬁrm L’s investors, and assumes the other
liabilities of L (the liquidity shock ρ). The outcomes in the other states are identical to those above.
We now show that ﬁrms have suﬃcient pledgeable income to support the equilibrium strategies.
The analysis for ﬁrm L is identical to that above. Firm H must have enough liquidity to withstand
41The ﬁnancial policy is generally not unique. For example, the ﬁrm can also set K
L
1,λ > −τ,a n di n c r e a s eK
L
2,(1−λ)
(as long as the pledgeability constraint is satisﬁed).
57its own liquidity shock in state λ. This equilibrium requires that KH
1,λ = ρ,a n dKH
1,(1−λ)λ = ρ + τ.
Notice also that since ﬁrm H is acquiring ﬁrm L,a sl o n ga sρ0 − δ>0 its pledgeable income will
increase in state (1 − λ)λ. The break-even constraint in this case is:
I − AH + λρ +( 1− λ)λ(ρ + τ)=( 1− λ(1 − λ))pGK∗
2 + λ(1 − λ)pGKH
2,(1−λ)λ.( 3 5 )
By equation 6, we can ﬁnd a solution such that pGK∗
2 ≤ ρ0,a n dpGKH
2,(1−λ)λ ≤ 2ρ0 − δ.T h u s ,ﬁrm
H can ﬁnance both its own liquidity shock, and also the liquidity merger.
Firm L cannot deviate from the equilibrium strategy since it does not have enough pledgeable
income to withstand the liquidity shock (as above). Firm H would beneﬁt from hoarding additional
liquidity to bid for the assets of ﬁrm L in state λ2, but it is constrained by date-0 pledgeable income
as we show now. If ﬁrm H deviates and demands enough liquidity to bid for ﬁrm L also in state λ2,
it would require a transfer KH
1,λ2 = KH
1,(1−λ)λ = ρ + τ. Thus, in order for investors to break even at
date 0 we would require:
I − AH + λρ +( 1− λ)λ[ρ + τ − (ρ0 − δ)] + λ2 [ρ + τ − (ρ0 − δ)] ≤ ρ0 (36)
which violates 6. Thus, the proposed strategies are optimal given the pledgeability constraints.
A p p e n d i xB . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Let us ﬁrst derive C and Dc
0, the optimal cash balance and debt level in the equilibrium without a
liquidity merger. Equations (13) and (14) imply that:
C =
I − AH + ρ − ρ0




ρ0 − ρ +( 1− ξ)C
pG
(38)
This solution is feasible as long as pGDc
0 ≤ ρ0, which implies the following constraint:
I − AH +
λ + ξ(1 − λ)
1 − ξ
ρ ≤ ρ0.( 3 9 )
Not surprisingly, this constraint becomes tighter as the cost of holding cash increases. If ξ =0 ,w eh a v e
the same feasibility condition as in the security-design case (Proposition 1), which is always obeyed
by condition 6. The parameter ξmax
NM can be deﬁned as the maximum cost of cash that is consistent
with condition 39. Finally, given that creditors break even, ﬁrm H’s payoﬀ is given by the project’s
total value minus the cost of carrying the cash balance C (equation 16), provided that ξ<ξ max
NM.
Let us move now to the equilibrium with a liquidity merger. CM must fund both the liquidity
s h o c ki ns t a t eλ, and the liquidity merger. Thus, we must have:
(1 − ξ)CM + ρ0 − pGDM
0 ≥ ρ,( 4 0 )
(1 − ξ)CM +2 ρ0 − δ − pGDM
0 ≥ ρ + τ. (41)
Finally, the debt level DM
0 must satisfy pGDM
0 ≤ ρ0.
Notice ﬁrst that since (CM, DM
0 ) must obey the same constraints as in the equilibrium with no liq-
uidity merger, we must have CM ≥ C,a n dDM
0 ≥ DC
0 . If this was not the case, then C and DC
0 would
58not be the optimal cash/debt combination in the equilibrium with no mergers. The ﬁrm has incen-
tives to minimize the amount of cash that it carries, and thus we know that C and Dc
0 are the lowest
amounts of cash and debt that satisfy the constraints in the equilibrium with no liquidity merger.
We now show that when condition 15 holds, we must have CM >C . Suppose for contradiction
that CM = C,a n dDM
0 = DC
0 . Since condition 15 holds, the ﬁrm needs to use some of its cash to
ﬁnance the liquidity merger. Formally, if we let y be the minimum amount of funds that the ﬁrm
needs to use in state (1 − λ)λ:
y +2 ρ0 − δ − pGDC
0 = ρ + τ,( 4 2 )
then it is clear that when condition 15 holds, y>0.T h u s , t h e ﬁrm returns only (1 − ξ)C − y to
date-0 investors in this state. Investors’ date-0 break-even constraint would then require:
pGDC
0 +( 1− λ)2(1 − ξ)C +( 1− λ)λ[(1 − ξ)C − y]=I − AH + C,( 4 3 )
which cannot hold by equation 14 (which is equivalent to 43, for y =0 ). In order for equation 43 to
hold, the amount of debt D0 must increase from DC
0 to DC
0 +ε. But then, equation 40 would require:





≥ ρ.( 4 4 )
This cannot hold, since (1 − ξ)C +ρ0 −pGDC
0 = ρ.T h u s ,t h eﬁrm must save an amount of cash that
is greater than C. In equilibrium, we must then have that CM >C ,a n dDM
0 >D C
0 . In addition, the
ﬁrm uses as little cash as possible in state (1 − λ)λ.I fw el e tyM represent this minimum amount of
cash that the ﬁrm needs to use, then the equilibrium is deﬁned by:
yM +2 ρ0 − δ − pGDM
0 = ρ + τ (45)
(1 − ξ)CM + ρ0 − pGDM
0 = ρ (46)
pGDM
0 +( 1− λ)2(1 − ξ)CM +( 1− λ)λ
£
(1 − ξ)CM − yM¤
= I − AH + CM.( 4 7 )
This solution is feasible as long as pGDM
0 (ξ) ≤ ρ0, where we expressed the optimal debt level as a
function of the cost of carrying cash. Since DM
0 ≥ DC
0 , this condition is less likely to hold for the same
cost of carrying cash ξ, and thus if we let ξmax
M denote the maximum possible cost of cash we must
have that ξmax
NM ≥ ξmax
M .T h eﬁrm’s payoﬀ is reduced by ξCM,a sl o n ga sξ<ξ max
M . This completes
the proof of the proposition.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
The analysis of the case without the liquidity merger is in the text. In the equilibrium with the
merger, the credit line wLC
max must satisfy equation 23, and also be suﬃcient to ﬁnance the liquidity
s h o c ki ns t a t eλ (if the line is not revoked):
wLC
max + ρ0 − pGDLC
0 ≥ ρ.( 4 8 )
Thus, in the liquidity merger equilibrium the total size of the credit line depends on the ﬁrm’s
relative need for pre-committed ﬁnancing in states λ and (1−λ)λ.I fw ed e ﬁne the amount by which
the ﬁrm expects to use the credit line in state λ as:
wλ = ρ + pGDLC
0 − ρ0,( 4 9 )
59and the amount by which the ﬁrm expects to use the credit line in state (1 − λ)λ by:
w(1−λ)λ =m a x
£
ρ + τ + pGDLC
0 − 2ρ0 + δ,0
¤
,( 5 0 )
then the optimal size of the credit line is given by the maximum of these two values:
wLC
max =m a x ( wλ,w (1−λ)λ).( 5 1 )
Ac r e d i tl i n eo fs i z ewLC
max ensures that the ﬁrm has enough liquidity to ﬁnance both its own liquidity
shock, and also the liquidity merger. Notice that while wλ is always greater than zero, w(1−λ)λ might
be equal to zero.
As in the no-merger equilibrium, the ﬁrm ﬁnances the credit line by paying the commitment fee
in the state in which the credit line is not used (state (1 − λ)2):
λ(1 − q)wλ +( 1− λ)λw(1−λ)λ =( 1− λ)2xM,( 5 2 )
where xM (the commitment fee in the liquidity merger equilibrium) must be lower than the ﬁrm’s
pledgeable income in state (1− λ)2,t h a ti s ,xM ≤ ρ0 −pGDLC
0 . This implies the following feasibility
constraint:
I − AH + λ(1 − q)ρ +( 1− λ)λ(ρ + τ − ρ0 + δ) ≤ (1 − λq)ρ0 + λqτ.( 5 3 )
This inequality is implied by assumption 6, so that the credit line is always feasible. Thus, the credit
line is always feasible in both equilibria.
As in the no-merger equilibrium, the main cost of the credit line is that it can be revoked in state
λ.T h eﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is then given by equation 24.
Appendix D. Endogenizing line of credit revocability
T h ea n a l y s i so fl i n eo fc r e d i ti m p l e m e n t a t i o ni nS e c t i o n3 . 2 . 2t a k e st h ep r o b a b i l i t yq as an exogenous
parameter. We now show that this probability can be endogenized in a framework in which the
probability of the liquidity shock λ is partly determined by managerial actions. For that purpose, we
add another date to the model between date 0 and date 1 in which the manager must choose between
two actions. The good action produces a probability of the date-1 liquidity shock equal to λG,a n d
the bad action produces a probability λB >λ G, but a private beneﬁte q u a lt oB0 for the manager.
The optimal contract must be designed to induce the good action.
Denote the manager’s continuation utilities following the realization of the liquidity shock by Uλ
(if the ﬁrm is hit with the liquidity shock), and U1−λ (if the liquidity shock does not occur). Then,
the manager’s incentive constraint requires that:
(1 − λG)U1−λ + λGUλ ≥ (1 − λB)U1−λ + λBUλ + B0,( 5 4 )
which implies that:




In order to induce the manager to take the right action, the optimal credit line must ensure that the
manager’s continuation utility depends on whether the liquidity shock is realized or not. As we now
show, revoking the credit line in state λ allows the credit line to satisfy condition 55.
60Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium without the liquidity merger. In that case, the continuation utilities
for H’s manager are:
U1−λ = ρ1 − pGDLC
0 (56)
Uλ =( 1 − q)(ρ1 − pGDLC
0 ).
At date 1, the initial investment I is sunk and thus does not need to be considered. In the line or
credit implementation of Section 3.2.2, the manager pays for the liquidity shock in state λ by raising
capital from date-1 investors and the credit line. Thus, the manager’s payoﬀ at that point is equal to
the project’s total expected payoﬀ, minus what was promised to date-0 investors. Finally, if the ﬁrm
is liquidated (with probability q), the manager receives a zero payoﬀ. We conclude that to induce
managerial behavior the probability q must satisfy:
q∗ =
B0
λG − λB(ρ1 − pGDLC
0 )
> 0.( 5 7 )
Notice that the probability that the credit line is revoked is as low as possible to minimize liquidation
costs.
The analysis is similar for the liquidity merger equilibrium. The main diﬀerence is that the
continuation utility in state (1 − λ) is higher than U1−λ due to the expected payoﬀ from the merger:
UM
1−λ = ρ1 − pGDLC
0 + λ(ρ1 − ρ0).( 5 8 )
To understand this expression, notice that the merger happens with probability λ (the probability
that L is distressed). If the merger happens, it produces total expected cash ﬂows equal to ρ1−δ,a n d
pledgeable cash ﬂows equal to ρ0 − δ which are entirely used by the manager to ﬁnance the required
investment of ρ + τ (and in addition, the manager may use the credit line). Thus, the manager’s
expected payoﬀ from the merger is equal to λ(ρ1 − ρ0). The expression for UM
1−λ implies that the
expression for q is now:
0 <q M =
B0
λG−λB − λ(ρ1 − ρ0)
ρ1 − pGDLC
0
<q ∗.( 5 9 )
Notice that the line of credit can be revoked less often in the liquidity merger equilibrium, because the
possibility of acquiring ﬁrm L (which happens only in state (1 − λ)) improves managerial incentives.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
Cash implementation is always feasible when ξ =0and it is not feasible when ξ =1(see equation
39) so ξmax
NM > 0.I fξ>ξ max
NM the ﬁrm cannot use cash and will prefer the credit line (recall that the
credit line is always feasible). If ξ<ξ max
NM, cash implementation is feasible. If ξ = q =0 , then the
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between cash and the credit line, so that qNM(0) = 0.N o w ,t a k eaq
0
> 0.F o rξ
small enough, the ﬁrm prefers cash to the credit line if q = q
0
, because of the expected loss from the
revocability of the credit line, λq
0
(ρ1 −ρ−τ).A sξ increases, UNC
H decreases monotonically until the
point at which λq
0




), such that the ﬁrm is again indiﬀerent between cash and




. A similar procedure will produce the cost of cash ξ
that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between cash and credit lines, for all q ≤ 1. Clearly, q0
NM(ξ) ≥ 0.
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The proof of the existence of the function qM(ξ) is identical to the proof above. For all q ≤ 1,w et a k e
the value of ξ that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between cash and the credit line. Clearly, q0
M(ξ) ≥ 0.T o
show that qM(ξ) ≥ qNM(ξ), take again q = q
0
as above. The cost of cash that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent
can be deﬁned as λq
0




).S i n c e CM >C ,a n d
∂ξCM(ξ)





. Since the same point holds for all q ≤ 1,w em u s th a v et h a tqM(ξ) ≥ qNM(ξ) (see Figure 1).
Appendix G. Combining cash and credit lines (Section 4.1)
Denote by CJ the amount of cash that the ﬁr mw o u l dn e e dt oh o l di ns u c haj o i n tp o l i c y ,a n db yDJ
the associated promised repayment at date 2. Let the credit line be big enough such that the ﬁrm
can ﬁnance the bid for the other ﬁrm using the line. It only pays for the ﬁrm to deviate from the line
of credit-only policy if it saves enough cash to survive the liquidity shock in state λ with probability
1. Since the line of credit will not be available in some states of the world, this condition requires:
(1 − ξ)CJ + ρ0 − pGDJ = ρ.( 6 0 )
The promised payment must in turn satisfy:
pGDJ = I − AH + λCJ +( 1− λ)ξCJ +( 1− λ)λ[ρ + τ − ρ0 + δ] ≤ ρ0 (61)
Notice that the ﬁrm uses cash to withstand the liquidity shock, and the credit line to pay for the
liquidity merger. This means that the ﬁrm can return (1 − ξ)CJ to investors in state (1 − λ).T h e
line of credit—cash joint policy implies the following payoﬀ:
UJ
H = UM
H − ξCJ (62)
The joint policy dominates the line of credit-only policy if it is feasible, and if the cost of carrying
cash ξCJ is lower than the expected loss from revocability, λq(ρ1 − ρ − τ). The cash balance CJ is
higher than in an equilibrium with no mergers, because the ﬁrm must take into account that opening
t h el i n eo fc r e d i tw i l lc o s ts o m ed e b tc a p a c i t yf o rt h eﬁrm in state λ. However, the required cash
balance is generally lower than CM, given that the ﬁrm does not need to save additional cash with the
speciﬁc purpose of ﬁnancing the liquidity merger. Thus, it is possible that this joint policy dominates
a line of credit-only in the liquidity merger equilibrium.
Allowing for the possibility of a joint policy does not change the conclusion that the ﬁrm is
more likely to use lines of credit in the liquidity merger equilibrium. Consider the region in which
q<q NM(ξ). For these parameter values, the ﬁrm chooses the line of credit in both equilibria.
In particular, this implies that the cost of carrying cash ξC is higher than the expected loss from
revocability, λq(ρ1 − ρ − τ) in that region. Thus, the ﬁrm will not ﬁnd it optimal to implement the
joint policy in this region, even in the equilibrium with liquidity mergers. As derived above the cost
o fc a r r y i n gc a s hi ns u c hac a s ei sξCJ >ξ C , which is necessarily larger than the expected loss from
revocability. We conclude that the joint policy can only be optimal if q>q NM(ξ), which is the region
in which cash is optimal in the equilibrium with no liquidity mergers.
62Appendix H. Multi-ﬁrm setting
We now show that in the multi-ﬁrm setting described in Section 4.6 the probability of a liquidity
merger goes down relative to the two-ﬁrm case analyzed above. We also show that the model’s key
result continues to hold. That is, ﬁrm H is more likely to use credit lines in the liquidity merger
equilibrium.
As we discuss in Section 4.6., the key diﬀerence in the model set up is that the probability that
an individual ﬁrm H that has high liquidity (that is, a ﬁrm H that is in state 1 − λ and does not
need to ﬁnance a liquidity shock) will ﬁnd a ﬁn a n c i a l l yd i s t r e s s e dt a r g e tg o e sd o w nf r o mλ to λ
0
.
Proposition 1 (which describes the equilibrium under state-contingent contracting) continues to hold.
If condition 7 holds, liquidity mergers are not proﬁtable and all ﬁrms follow the same strategies that
are described in the proposition. If condition 8 holds, then liquidity mergers will happen. Since liq-
uidity shocks are idiosyncratic, in every state of the world there will be (1−μ)λ ﬁrms that are in need
for a liquidity infusion, and μ(1 − λ) potential acquirers. Distressed ﬁrms are randomly allocated to
potential acquirers, who, conditional on ﬁnding a potential target, demand the same liquidity as they
needed in the benchmark model. If a potential acquirer does not ﬁnd a distressed target (probability
1 − λ
0
), it returns funds to investors such that investors break even. The date-0 expected payoﬀs
in the equilibrium with no liquidity merger are identical to those described in equation 9, while the
date-0 expected payoﬀs in the liquidity merger equilibrium are:
UM




(2ρ1 − ρ − δ − τ)] + λ(ρ1 − ρ) − I (63)
UL =( 1 − λ)ρ1 + λτ − I.
The implementation of the no-liquidity merger equilibrium using cash and credit lines is identical
to that described above. In the liquidity merger equilibrium, ﬁrms of type H must now take into
account the fact that the probability of a liquidity merger is equal to λ
0
.
We now show that we must have CM >C
0
,t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrm needs to save less cash than in the
two-ﬁrm case. If we let y
0
represent the minimum amount of cash that the ﬁrm needs to use to help
fund the liquidity merger, then the equilibrium is deﬁned by:
y
0
+2 ρ0 − δ − pGD
0
0 = ρ + τ (64)
(1 − ξ)C
0
+ ρ0 − pGD
0
0 = ρ (65)
pGD
0
0 +( 1− λ)(1 − λ
0






= I − AH + C
0
.( 6 6 )
Since λ
0
<λ , a comparison of these equations with 45, 46, and 47 shows that equation 66 can be
satisﬁed by a lower debt level (D
0
0 <D M
0 ), since the ﬁrm returns more cash to the bank in expectation
λ
0
<λ . In turn, since D
0
0 <D M
0 , equation 65 implies that CM >C
0
. This implies that the ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ is higher than in the benchmark case in the cash implementation solution.
Financing the liquidity merger with the credit line is almost identical to the benchmark model.
Firm H must have enough liquidity to ﬁnance the bid for ﬁrm L, if a target shows up This requires:
wLC
max +2 ρ0 − pGDLC
0 − δ ≥ ρ + τ,( 6 7 )
which is the same as the condition above. Firm H ﬁnances the credit line by paying the commitment
fee in states in which the credit line is not used (probability (1−λ)(1−λ
0
)). This implies the following
63feasibility constraint:
I − AH + λ(1 − q)ρ +( 1− λ)λ
0
(ρ + τ − ρ0 + δ) ≤ (1 − λq)ρ0 + λqτ.( 6 8 )
This inequality is implied by condition 6, so that t h ec r e d i tl i n ei sa l w a y sf e a s i b l e . T h em a i nc o s t
o ft h ec r e d i tl i n ei st h a ti tc a nb er e v o k e di ns t a t eλ.T h e ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is then given by
equation 24, as in the benchmark model.
Thus, using cash to implement the liquidity merger equilibrium increases the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ,w h i l e
using credit line results in an identical payoﬀ to that of the benchmark case. We conclude that the
ﬁrm is relatively more likely to use cash in this multi-ﬁrm extension. More formally, there exists a
function q(ξ), satisfying q0(ξ) ≥ 0 and q(0) = 0, such that if q>q (ξ),t h eﬁrm prefers cash to lines of
credit and if q<q (ξ),t h eﬁrm prefers lines of credit to cash. Finally, it must be that qM(ξ) ≥ q(ξ).
In terms of Figure 2, q(ξ) will lie between qM(ξ) and qNM(ξ). Although qualiﬁed in this context, our
model’s main results continue to hold.
Appendix I. Pooling idiosyncratic risk in credit line provision
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, a key feature of the credit line is that it can be provided to the ﬁrms
at an actuarially fair cost. In order for this to be the case, a ﬁnancial intermediary must be able to
fund the demand for credit line drawdowns without holding cash in the balance sheet. Since holding
cash is costly, the intermediary would then have to charge higher commitment fees to break even.
In this section we prove that under the assumptions of our model, a ﬁnancial intermediary can in-
deed provide credit lines at an actuarially fair cost. The key to this result, as explained by Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006) is the intermediary’s ability to pool liquidity risks across ﬁrms.
In order to show this point, consider the same set up of Section 4.6.. There are several ﬁrms of types
L and H, of total measure equal to one. The fraction of ﬁrms of type H is equal to μ.F i r m so ft y p eL
do not demand liquidity. If ﬁrms of type H suﬀer a liquidity shock (state λ), they draw on the credit
line and fund the shock. If they do not suﬀer a shock (state 1−λ), then they have a probability equal
to λ
0
to acquire a ﬁrm of type L. In that case, they make additional drawdowns on their credit line.
Under the assumptions of the model, both types of ﬁrms have enough pledgeable income to ﬁnance
these strategies, that is:
I − AL ≤ (1 − λ)ρ0 + λτ (69)
I − AH ≤ (1 − λ)(1 − λ
0
)ρ0 − (1 − λ)λ
0
[ρ + τ − (2ρ0 − δ)] − λ(ρ − ρ0).
Since λ
0
<λ , it is straightforward to show that these pledgeability conditions are implied by conditions
5a n d6 .
Now, consider the ﬁnancial intermediary’s pledgeability constraint. The intermediary provides
ﬁnancing to all ﬁrms in the model, and uses payments from liquid ﬁrms to fund credit line drawdowns
by ﬁrms of type H. Since liquidity shocks are idiosyncratic, all states of the world are identical. In
each state, there are μλ ﬁrms of type H who draw on the credit line to fund the liquidity shock, and
μ(1−λ)λ
0
ﬁrms of type H who draw on the line to fund the liquidity merger. There are μ(1−λ)(1−λ
0
)
ﬁrms of type H who do not need liquidity and return pledgeable income to the bank. In addition,
no ﬁrms of type L demand liquidity. (1 − μ)λ ﬁrms of type Lget liquidated or acquired (producing
64pledgeable income equal to τ), and (1−μ)(1−λ) ﬁrms produce pledgeable income equal to ρ0.T h u s ,
the bank’s feasibility constraint requires that:
μ
h
λ(ρ − ρ0)+( 1− λ)λ
0
[ρ + τ − (2ρ0 − δ)]
i
≤ μ(1 − λ)(1 − λ
0
)ρ0 +( 1− μ)λτ + (70)
+(1 − μ)(1 − λ)ρ0
This condition is implied by those in 69, for any value of μ. Thus, the bank has enough pledgeable
income ﬂowing from liquid ﬁrms to fund credit line drawdowns, and does not need to hold capital
(save cash) in its balance sheet.
65